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INTRODUCTION 
 
There are many reasons to study human punishment decision-making. For one, it directly 
impacts the lives of millions whom are punished by the criminal justice system every day. A 
recent study found that one out of three Americans have been arrested for an offense (Brame et 
al., 2014). Beyond mere arrest, on a daily basis nearly 7 million individuals are either being 
actively imprisoned, jailed, or are under probation or parole (Glaze and Kaeble, 2014). Beyond 
the number of people, the costs are astounding. The most recent data indicate that the United 
States spent over a quarter of a trillion dollars on justice system expenditures in 2012 alone 
(Kyckelhahn, 2015). For comparison, the National Institutes of Health received approximately 
$30 billion in federal money that same year and all federal research expenditures totaled less 
than $65 billion. Of course, this is not to make a normative or empirical claim as to whether 
more or fewer people need to be punished or that more or less must be spent on justice, just that 
justice isn’t cheap.  
The amount spent on justice stands in stark contrast to what we know about the 
mechanisms of human punishment decision-making. Punishment decision-making is often 
irrational and easily swayed by spurious factors. The most salient, and popularly discussed, is the 
effect of offender race on punishment decisions (Steffensmeier et al., 1998; Tonry 1995). While 
the insidious effect of racial bias has been known–and even acknowledged–for some time, the 
discussion of its influence came to a head when, in 1986, Warren McCleskey appealed his death 
sentence to the United States Supreme Court on the ground that Georgia’s capital sentencing 
process was administered in a manner that violated his rights to equal protection under the law, 
as guaranteed by the 14th amendment (McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)). McCleskey 
cited a study authored by David C. Baldus and two colleagues that empirically examined 
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effect of race on the likelihood a defendant would receive a penalty of death (Baldus et al., 
1983). Baldus et al. found that, after controlling for nearly 40 possible non-racial variables, a 
defendant charged with killing a white victim was 4.3 times as likely to be sentenced to death as 
a defendant charged with killing a black victim (McCleskey at 287). The decision by the Court, 
in a stunningly candid admission of how imperfect punishment intuitions are, noted that while 
the study may indicate that there is a discrepancy that “appears to correlate with race [,] . . . 
disparities in sentencing are an inevitable part of our criminal justice system” (McCleskey at 
313) and thus did not, by itself, support a conclusion that the right to equal protection under the 
law had not been violated. To be sure, arbitrary influences beyond race exist as well. Studies 
have shown that punishment decisions can be easily biased by any number of factors. One 
particularly disturbing result demonstrated how a parole board’s decisions appeared to correlate 
one to one with how long had lapsed since their last break (Danziger et al., 2011). Thus, if for no 
other reason, studying how we make punishment decisions is therefore important so that we can 
better understand how and when they go wrong.     
Though studying punishment is also important for what it gets right. Simply put, 
punishment promotes cooperation. The type of large-scale cooperation amongst non-kin that 
defines the human species is impossible without the threat that defection will be met with 
punishment of some form (Fehr and Gachter, 2002a; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004; Bowles and 
Gintis, 2011). When this punishment is carried out by an uninvolved third party (“third-party 
punishment”), it is particularly effective in ensuring stable cooperation on the massive scales 
seen in society today (Boyd and Richerson, 2005; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005; Mathew and 
Boyd, 2011). This is in contrast to second-party punishment, when the punishment is 
administered by the person who was the victim of the norm violation. The theoretical and 
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observational research that has led to the conclusion that third-party punishment is central to 
what makes us human is only further buttressed by evidence that we are–seemingly–the only 
species to engage in third-party punishment behavior (Riedl et al., 2012). This stands in stark 
contrast to the observation that numerous species, besides humans, engage in acts of second-
party punishment (Mulder and Langmore, 1993; Bshary and Grutter, 2005; Wenseleers and 
Ratnieks, 2006). This stark distinction in human and animal behavior only emphasizes the role 
that human neurobiology plays in punishment, and accordingly, in providing the framework that 
supports the fabric of modern society. 
Given its importance, a number of studies have begun to address the question of why and 
how we punish. As for why, research has examined both the types of norm violations that lead to 
third-party punishment as well as the cognitive and behavioral states that may induce or motivate 
punishment behavior in response to the norm violation.  
As for the characteristics of a norm-violation that are associated with punishment, 
behavioral studies have identified that there are two primary components that appear to dictate 
the outcome of third-party punishment. These are (1) the mental state of the offender; and (2) the 
severity of harm he caused (Carlsmith et al., 2002a; Cushman, 2008). Mental state of the 
offender refers to the intention of the offender in relation to the resulting harm, recognizing the 
same result can be attributable to both innocent or illicit intentions. The importance of mental 
state in punishment decisions aligns with real-world legal norms and practice dating back 
millennia (LaFave et al., 1986; Shen et al., 2011) and is embraced as a central tenet of our notion 
of due process: actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea, or “the act is not culpable unless the 
mind is guilty." Though ancient in origin, the dynamics of how intentions and harm outcomes are 
integrated into a punishment decision have not been extensively studied. In the behavioral 
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component of chapter one we examine how mental state and harm integrate into a punishment 
decision.  
To understand why we punish, we must not only understand the types of norm-violations 
that trigger punishment behavior, but also uncover the internal motivation to respond to norm 
violations with punishment. Though there are highly rational reasons for why one should punish 
a wrongdoer–and our criminal justice system assumes that those that make punishment decisions 
are disinterested and impartial–there is much evidence to suggest that it is also subject to 
emotional influence (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Salerno and Peter-Hagene, 2013; Anon, 2014). 
Indeed, it has been suggested that emotional responses to a crime can strongly predict the 
administered punishment (Buckholtz et al., 2008), in line with the widely-held notion that 
emotions are powerful drivers of adaptive behavior (Plutchik, 1980). In chapters three and four 
we begin to explore the emotional motivators of punishment decisions. 
Chapter three examines the correspondence between emotional states and punishment 
outcomes in the third-party context. Though it may be widely acknowledged that emotions serve 
as a driving force underlying TPP, there is considerable uncertainty regarding which emotional 
states are specifically linked to punishment. The past few decades have laid witness to research 
identifying moral outrage, contempt, anger, and disgust as all playing a role in third-party 
punishment (Rozin et al., 1999; Carlsmith et al., 2002a; Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; Russell 
and Piazza, 2013; Shweder et al., 2013). In chapter three we attempt to provide some clarity by 
independently and parametrically manipulating both mental state culpability and harm severity, 
and examining how contempt, anger, disgust, and moral outrage map onto these distinct 
components. We further examined how these emotions may differentially mediate the 
relationship between the norm violation and the punishment. We find that unlike anger, 
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contempt, and disgust, moral outrage is evoked by the integration of culpable mental state and 
resulting harms, and it alone mediates the relationship between this integrative process and 
punishment decisions. We conclude that, distinct from other emotional responses, moral outrage 
captures the interaction of mental state and harm to fuel punishment.  
As noted at the outset of this introduction, punishment can come from both an uninvolved 
third party, as well as from the victim of the norm-violation himself. Both second and third-party 
punishment have been observed in humans and some evidence has indicated that individuals 
punish similarly, regardless of whether they are the victim of the norm violation or not (Chavez 
and Bicchieri, 2013; Lergetporer et al., 2014). That we respond to second- and third-party norm 
violations similarly hints that both processes likely engage a similar cognitive process that 
responds to norm-violations generally. In Chapter four I examine how subjects respond to both 
second- and third-party norm violations in the course of interacting with other individuals in an 
interactive game. Our results indicate that while second- and third-parties respond to norm 
violations similarly in terms of how they punish wrongdoers, they report experiencing distinct 
emotional states as a result of the violation. Specifically, we observe that anger is almost entirely 
reported only by those who experience a second party violation while moral outrage is largely 
reported only by those who experience a third-party violation. These results indicate that while 
responses to second and third party violations may result in similar outcomes, they likely draw 
from distinct neurocognitive processes. These results can be related back to the results of chapter 
three as further evidence that moral outrage is a critical experience in the evaluation of third-
party wrongs.  
 Beyond why we punish, it is also important to understand how we punish. That is, 
neurobiologically, what brain systems contribute to, and support, the integration of mental state 
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and harm into a punishment decision. Prior research of punishment decision-making has hinted 
that these two different components rely on distinct brain systems to support their evaluation, 
with mentalization of others’ thoughts (assumed to be critical to evaluation of the mental state of 
an actor) correlated with heightened activity in temporoparietal junction (TPJ), superior temporal 
sulcus (STS) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) (Corradi-Dell'Acqua et al., 2014). 
Likewise, studies have found that the evaluation of harmful events is associated with affective 
circuitry such as the amygdala and the insula (Jackson et al., 2005; Buckholtz et al., 2008; 
Shenhav and Greene, 2014). These results have been proposed to extend to the differential 
contribution of these two sets of brain regions to punishment decision-making (Buckholtz and 
Marois, 2012), but this has not been formally tested. It also remains unclear what brain systems 
support the integration of these two components. Prior studies have identified heightened 
activation in the dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC), medial prefrontal (MPFC) and posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC) at the time of the punishment decision and this has been used to support 
the conclusion that these regions may support the integration of mental state and harm 
(Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015) – an argument buttressed by reports that 
MPFC and PCC may act as cortical “hubs” of information processing (Sporns et al., 2007; 
Buckner et al., 2009). In the neuroimaging component of chapter one we examine the brain 
systems engaged in the evaluation and integration of these separate components using fMRI, 
with a specific focus on testing the hypotheses detailed above. We overcome many limitations of 
previous research by implementing a novel experimental design that can parse the differential 
contribution of distinct components of punishment decision-making.  
 The results from this study confirm that evaluation of harms engaged brain areas 
associated with affective and somatosensory processing, whereas mental state evaluation 
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primarily recruited circuitry involved in mentalization. Further, the results provided strong 
evidence that harm and mental state evaluations are integrated in medial prefrontal and posterior 
cingulate structures, with the amygdala appearing to mediate the interaction between harm and 
mental state. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, on the other hand, displayed heightened activation at 
the time of the decision and also was unique in that it encoded the punishment decision.  
Among other findings, the results from the first chapter provided strong evidence that the 
amygdala was centrally involved in punishment decision-making. The one-to-one 
correspondence between activation in the amygdala and the punishment outcome hints at the 
possibility of a direct relationship between the two. However, functional imaging is not well-
situated to test this hypothesis and contemporary techniques for addressing causality (e.g., TMS 
& TDCS) are not well-suited for studying the amygdala. In chapter two I explore whether 
inducing activity in the amygdala through exogenous stimuli may affect punishment decision-
making. I test this by presenting subliminal cues that are known to induce activation in the 
amygdala. The results from this study fail to produce clearly interpretable data, but some 
possible interpretations are discussed.  
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1. PARSING THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN MECHANISMS OF THIRD-PARTY 
PUNISHMENT 
 
INTRODUCTION  
Punishment undergirds cooperation. Although forms of cooperation can occur without it, 
the potential for third-party punishment -- i.e. punishment administered by a neutral party -- 
helps counteract temptations to defect (free riding) (Fehr and Gachter, 2002b). This, in turn, 
enabled our species, with uniquely extensive cooperation among non-kin, to flourish at massive 
scales reflecting unparalleled social, technological, and economic achievement (Fehr and 
Rockenbach, 2004; Bowles and Gintis, 2011; Mathew and Boyd, 2011). Nonetheless, 
punishment decisions are costly to those punished and to society. Thus, efforts at criminal justice 
reform often center on improving and debiasing punishment decisions themselves, which are 
central to the fates of so many, and crucial to a just society. Yet despite its importance, little is 
known about the precise linkage between brain mechanisms and punishment decisions. 
Behavioral studies have identified the primary factors that influence punishment 
decisions: (1) the mental state of the offender; and (2) the severity of harm he caused (Carlsmith 
et al., 2002b; Cushman, 2008b). Although this comports with real-world legal norms and 
practices (LaFave et al., 1986; Shen et al., 2011), the process by which these two distinct 
components are integrated into a single punishment decision has not been well-characterized. 
Similarly, brain mechanisms underlying this integrative process remain poorly understood. Prior 
research of punishment decision-making has suggested that these two different components are 
neurally dissociable, with mental state evaluation primarily recruiting temporoparietal junction 
(TPJ), superior temporal sulcus (STS) and dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (DMPFC) (Corradi-
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Dell'Acqua et al., 2014), and the evaluation of harmful events predominantly engaging affective 
circuitry such as the amygdala and the insula (Jackson et al., 2005; Buckholtz et al., 2008; 
Shenhav and Greene, 2014). However, these studies did not elucidate the functional 
contribution(s) of each brain region to harm or mental state evaluation, and it remains unclear 
how and where these components integrate. Prior studies have pinpointed activation in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal (DLPFC), medial prefrontal (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) 
at the time of decision-making, suggesting these regions may support the integration of mental 
state and harm (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015) – an argument buttressed by 
reports that MPFC and PCC may act as cortical “hubs” of information processing (Sporns et al., 
2007; Buckner et al., 2009), though these studies could not dissociate integration from other task 
components. Finally, a debate persists about the specific role of the DLPFC in human 
punishment behavior. While some studies have associated DLPFC with implementation of 
cognitive control (Sanfey, 2003; Knoch et al., 2006; Haushofer and Fehr, 2008; Tassy et al., 
2012), we have claimed that the region acts as a superordinate node that supports the integration 
of signals to select the appropriate punishment decision (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Treadway et al., 
2014a; Buckholtz et al., 2015).  
The present study addresses these open questions by means of a novel experimental 
design. Specifically, the present design (1) independently and objectively parameterizes both the 
mental state and harm factors while (2) controlling information presentation in a manner 
allowing segregation of the evaluative, integrative, and response decision components of third-
party punishment decision-making. We achieved the first element of the design by using harm 
levels based on independent metrics and mental state levels based on the Model Penal Code’s 
hierarchy of mental state culpability (spanning blameless, negligent, reckless, knowing, and 
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purposeful) (Simons, 2003; Shen et al., 2011). To achieve the second element, trials were 
divided into distinct sequential segments (context presentation, followed by harm and mental 
state evaluations, followed by response decision), each separated from the others by an 
arithmetic task to limit cognitive processes to their respective stimulus presentations. Together, 
these manipulations permit the isolation of brain mechanisms involved in the harm and mental 
state evaluative processes, in the integration of these evaluative processes, and in the use of this 
information in selecting an appropriate punishment. 
 
METHODS 
 
Subjects 
Twenty-eight right-handed individuals (13 females, ages 18-35 yrs) with normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision consented to participate for financial compensation. The Vanderbilt 
University Institutional Review Board approved the experimental protocol, and subjects 
provided their informed consent. Five subjects were not included in the analysis: two did not 
complete the scan due to discomfort with the MRI pulse sequences; two had excessive motion (> 
3mm translation or 3 degrees of rotation) during the MRI scanning; and one failed to follow task 
instructions. That left twenty-three subjects (11 females, ages 18-35 yrs) for the analysis. 
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Paradigm 
In this fMRI experiment subjects participated in a simulated third-party legal decision-
making task in which they determined the appropriate level of hypothetical punishment for the 
actions of a fictional protagonist ("John") described in short written scenarios.  Participants were 
instructed to treat each scenario independently. The study improved on prior work in two 
principal ways: (1) by separating in time the cognitive processes of evaluating the harm and 
mental state components of the scenarios, the integration of these components, and the rendering 
of a punishment decision; and (2) by independently and objectively manipulating both the mental 
state of the actor and the resulting harm of the actor's conduct in a parametric fashion. 
With regard to the first objective of the experimental design, in contrast to prior studies 
(Buckholtz et al., 2008; Treadway et al., 2014a; Buckholtz et al., 2015) in which all components 
of each scenario were presented at once, components of each scenario were presented in distinct 
temporal stages, with each of the four stages separated from the others by a variable inter-stage-
interval (ISI) drawn from an exponentially decaying distribution of approximately 3 to 10 s 
(Figure 1). Stage A contained an introductory sentence describing the context in which the 
protagonist acted. Stages B and C each presented a sentence with either the Harm or the Mental 
State, respectively (we capitalize these terms when referring to a specific component of our task).  
The order in which Stages B and C appeared―Harm then Mental State, or Mental State then 
Harm―varied by trial within subject. Finally, Stage D presented the punishment scale on which 
subjects based their punishment decision and selected a punishment response by button press. 
Participants were instructed to make their response as soon as they had made a decision, but 
instructed not to rush (they had up to 16 seconds to make their response). 
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Fig. 1: Task Design 
 
Note: Each round began with the presentation of ‘Stage A’ as a Rapid Serial Visual Presentation 
(RSVP) of words, which only contained introductory information about the scenario. Following 
‘Stage A’, subjects were presented with the first of three intervening math tasks, which spanned 
the durations of each inter-stimulus interval (ISI). Subjects were then presented ‘Stage B’ and 
‘Stage C’, which contained the harm and mental state information respectively in randomized 
order. In the last ‘D’ stage subjects were probed for their punishment response. The variable ITI 
lasted for a duration of 3-15 seconds, with the last two seconds accompanied by a larger fixation 
square. ISI, Interstimulus interval; ITI, Intertrial interval; Var, Variable.   
 
Several details of the experiment were designed to optimize the likelihood that a given 
cognitive process occurred at a specific stage. First, in order to constrain the subjects' cognitive 
processing of each sentence to its presentation time and to preclude subjects from using the inter-
stage intervals to ponder the appropriate response, the inter-stage intervals were filled with a 
secondary math task that lasted the duration of each ISI. Each math problem started 200ms after 
a stage’s end and included a series of addition or subtraction operations on integers between 1 
and 9, with a solution between 0 and 9. The number of operations scaled with the ISI length. All 
integers and operations were individually presented at the center of the screen, changing at a rate 
 13 
of 1 item per 750ms and followed at the end by a '=', indicating that the subject should provide a 
response within 2 seconds. If no response was provided the task continued as if a response had 
been made. For example, a 3 second ISI would consist of two integers and one operation (e.g., 3, 
+, 5) for 2 s plus an average of a 1s-long response time. A small white fixation square (0.25° of 
visual angle) appeared following the subject's response. 
Second, to help ensure that subjects were only processing the information presented 
during each of Stages A, B and C (and not using some of that time cogitating about a previous 
stage’s information), we presented the scenarios as a rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP), 
wherein a given stage’s words were presented sequentially at the center of the screen at the rate 
of 6 words per second (rather than being presented simultaneously in a full sentence) and 
followed immediately by the ISI. This rate of word presentation was selected because it does not 
reduce subjects' reading comprehension (Castelhano and Muter, 2001). We controlled for word 
length across Harm and Mental State sentences, as well as across the different harm levels, with 
an average scenario length of 77 words (SD of 4). Because the rate of word presentation was 
fixed and the duration of each stage was a function of the word length, stimulus duration was 
thus controlled for as well.  
Third, to delay the time of the subject’s punishment judgment until the decision stage, on 
each trial we randomly presented subjects at the decision stage with one of several available 
punishment scales. Overall, there were 10 different punishment scales; one "master" scale and 
nine derivative scales. The master scale, which spanned the entire range of possible punishments, 
was anchored such that '0' = no punishment, '3' = 1 day in jail, '6' = 1 year in jail, and '9' = most 
severe punishment that the subject personally endorsed. The nine derivative scales essentially 
“zoomed in” on a part of the master scale and remapped the 0 to 9 response space accordingly. 
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As an example, a derivative scale may look like: '0' = 1 day in jail, '6' = 1 year in jail, and '9' = 
most severe punishment. For any given scenario, six of the 10 scales were available as possible 
options, with one of the six randomly selected for any given trial. The six scales per scenario 
were selected so as to ensure, based on pilot data, that the mean punishment response +/- 2 
standard deviations fell within the confines of the scale. Thus, we nearly guaranteed the available 
scale included the desired punishment response for each scenario. For analysis purposes, we 
algebraically converted the responses provided on the derivative scales to the equivalent 
response on the master scale (e.g., if a subject responded ‘0’ on the derivative scale presented 
above it was coded as a ‘3’).  
The data indicate that our efforts were largely successful in delaying subjects’ 
punishment decisions to Stage D. First, pilot data showed a substantial increase in the amount of 
time subjects spent at the final stage (M = 4.02, SD = 1.84) compared to when that stage was not 
preceded by the ISI math task and RSVP format and did not include shifting scales, but did 
segregate the task stages (M = 2.45, SD = 2.09). Second, at the time of the decision the 
distribution in reaction times was not uniform across levels of Harm or Mental State, as one 
would expect if subjects had made their decisions prior to Stage D. Instead there is a significant 
effect of both Mental State and Harm level on subject reaction time (see Figure 2B-C). 
Following the subjects’ response, an inter-trial interval (ITI) drawn from a decaying 
exponential distribution from 3 to 15 seconds began. The small white fixation square was 
presented for the duration of the ITI except that it was enlarged (to 0.49° of visual angle) for the 
last two seconds of the ITI to signal to the participants the imminent start of the next trial (see 
Figure 1 for trial design).  
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To achieve the second principal experimental objective (independent and objective 
manipulation of the Mental State and Harm components in a parametric fashion) our scenarios 
parametrically manipulated the mental state of the actor using four of the five Model Penal Code 
categories. These are―in descending order of intentionality―purposeful (P), reckless (R), 
negligent (N), and blameless (B) (knowing was not included here because of subjects’ difficulty 
in distinguishing this category from reckless in behavioral studies (Shen et al., 2011; Ginther et 
al., 2014)). The harm resulting from the actor's actions also varied parametrically in four 
categories, ranging from de minimis (no or insubstantial harm), to substantial (but impermanent), 
permanently life altering, and, finally, death. In figures we categorize these as Harm 1 through 
Harm 4. 
Some of the scenarios were based upon scenarios used in previous research (Shen et al., 
2011) while others were crafted for this study. The complete scenario set is available from the 
authors. Individual scenarios were derived from 64 distinct “themes.” Each theme contained a 
unique set of contextual facts and the eventual harm. The severity of each harm fell into one of 
the four distinct categories described earlier, and there were 16 themes for each level of Harm. In 
a pilot experiment we had 23 online subjects rate the severity of the harm sentences alone (on a 0 
to 9 scale) to fine tune and verify our categorization of the scenarios along the four Harm levels 
(Harm 1: M = 1.49, SD = 0.29; Harm 2: M = 3.67, SD = 0.50; Harm 3: M = 6.13, SD = 0.37; 
Harm 4: M = 8.64, SD = 0.24). These subjects were recruited using Amazon’s Mechanical Turk, 
which provides a sample of high-quality participants largely representative of the population 
(Rand, 2012). Within each theme, the scenarios also varied the mental state of the protagonist 
across four possible levels of Mental State (Tables 1a and 1b).  
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The levels of the two factors were orthogonal to one another such that on any given trial 
the Harm level did not predict the Mental State level, or vice versa. The 64 different themes, four 
levels of Mental State, and two possible orderings (Harm first or Mental State first), yielded a 
total of 512 different possible scenarios (64x4x2), 64 of which were presented to each subject in 
pseudorandomized fashion. Each subject saw a single scenario from each theme and all scenario 
conditions were balanced within each subject (i.e. subjects saw four scenarios in each Mental 
State (4 levels) x Harm (4 levels) cell in the factorial design). An example of a single theme and 
the eight derivative scenarios is presented in Tables 1a and 1b. Please note that details of the text 
could change for a given cell (e.g. see reckless mental state) depending on its order of 
presentation to increase both its believability and comprehensibility. Because of the complexity 
and novelty of the current paradigm, we first assessed whether it would yield similar punishment 
responses to those acquired when each scenario was presented in its entirety in the same frame 
(Buckholtz et al., 2008; Treadway et al., 2014a). This possibility was tested by recruiting 20 
subjects to complete the third-party punishment task online by means of Amazon's Mechanical 
Turk. These subjects were presented with scenarios in their complete paragraph form in a single 
frame and subjects read at their own pace. There was no statistical difference in punishment 
ratings between these subjects and the participants who completed the present experiment 
(F(1,41) = 1.41, p = 0.241).  
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Table 1a: Illustrative Theme (Planks & Bikes): Four “Mental-State First” 
Variations. 
Introductory Sentence 
John is hauling planks to his cabin because he is in the middle of doing carpentry work 
on his house, which abuts a public mountain bike trail. 
Purposeful Reckless Negligent Blameless 
Mental State Mental State Mental State Mental State 
Angry with the 
mountain bikers for 
making too much 
noise when biking 
past his house, John 
desires to injure 
some bikers by 
dropping planks on 
their trail so that 
they would hit 
them. 
John drops some 
planks onto the trail 
without retrieving 
them because he’s 
in a rush, even 
though he is aware 
there is a 
substantial risk 
bikers will hit them 
and be injured. 
While John is 
carrying planks to 
his workshop in 
order to begin 
building new steps 
for his house, he 
drops some of the 
wood planks onto 
the bike trail 
without even 
noticing. 
While John is 
carefully carrying 
some planks from 
his shed to the 
backyard, an 
unexpectedly strong 
gust of wind causes 
John to 
inadvertently drop 
several planks, 
despite his best 
efforts not to. 
Harm Sentence 
Soon after John drops the planks, two bikers pass by and they hit the planks, which 
causes them to flip over their handlebars and one of the bikers suffers serious injuries 
as a result. 
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Table 1b: Illustrative Theme (Planks & Bikes): Four “Harm First” Variations. 
Introductory Sentence 
John is hauling planks to his cabin because he is in the middle of doing carpentry work 
on his house, which abuts a public mountain bike trail. 
Harm Sentence 
Soon after John crosses the trail, two bikers pass by and they hit planks that John 
dropped onto the trail, which causes them to flip over their handlebars and one of the 
bikers suffers serious injuries as a result. 
Purposeful Reckless Negligent Blameless 
Mental State Mental State Mental State Mental State 
Angry with the 
mountain bikers for 
making too much 
noise when biking 
past his house, John 
had desired to 
injure some bikers 
by dropping planks 
on the trail so that 
they would hit 
them. 
John had dropped 
some planks onto 
the trail without 
retrieving them 
because he was in a 
rush, even though 
he was aware there 
was a substantial 
risk some bikers 
would hit them and 
be injured. 
While John was 
carrying planks to 
his workshop in 
order to begin 
building new steps 
for his house, he 
had dropped some 
of the wood planks 
onto the bike trail 
without even 
noticing. 
While John was 
carefully carrying 
planks from his 
shed to the 
backyard, he 
slipped on some 
mud, which caused 
him to 
unknowingly drop 
several planks, 
despite his best 
efforts not to. 
Note: Subjects evaluated only one of the possible eight scenarios for each theme.  
 
Scenarios were presented in pseudorandomized fashion, ensuring that in each 16-trial 
fMRI run, subjects rated the punishment for one scenario in each cell of the 4 Mental State x 4 
Harm-level design. The runs varied in duration given the variable response times, but never 
lasted more than 11.5 minutes. Each subject completed four of these fMRI runs. The experiment 
was programmed in Matlab (Mathworks, Natick MA) using the Psychophysics Toolbox 
extension (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). Subjects were positioned supine in the scanner to be able 
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to view the projector display using a mirror mounted on the head coil. Manual responses were 
recorded using two five-button keypads (Rowland Institute of Science, Cambridge, MA). 
 
Statistical Analysis: Behavioral Data 
We analyzed trial-wise punishment responses by testing a family of multiple linear 
regression models by means of a mixed-effects model, treating subject as a random factor. We 
analyzed seven models, consisting of all combinations of the Mental State (0 = blameless, 1 = 
negligent, 2 = reckless, 3 = purposeful), Harm (0 = de minimis, 1 = substantial, 2 = life altering, 
and 3 = death), and interaction components (Table 2). Models were assessed using the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC), which quantifies both model fit and simplicity. While AIC scores 
constitute a unitless measure, a relatively lower AIC score reflects a more accurate and 
generalizable model. Subject parameters used below are estimated using the best model as 
identified by AIC score.  
 
fMRI Data Acquisition 
Our imaging pulse sequences and image acquisition followed conventional methods. All 
fMRI scans were acquired using a 3T Philips Achieva scanner at the Vanderbilt University 
Institute of Imaging Science. Low- and High-resolution structural scans were first acquired using 
conventional parameters. Functional Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) images were 
acquired using a gradient-echo echoplanar imaging (EPI) pulse sequence with the following 
parameters: TR 2000 ms, TE 35 ms, flip angle 79°, FOV 192 × 112 × 192 mm, with 34 axial 
 20 
slices (3.0 mm, 0.3 mm gap) oriented parallel to the AC-PC line and collected in an ascending 
interleaved pattern (T2* weighted).  
 
Statistical Analysis: fMRI Data  
Image analysis was conducted using Brain Voyager QX 2.8 (Brain Innovation, 
Maastricht, The Netherlands) in conjunction with custom Matlab software. All images were 
preprocessed using slice timing correction, 3D motion correction, linear trend removal (1/128 
Hz), temporal high pass filtering and spatial smoothing with a 6 mm Gaussian kernel (FWHM) 
as implemented through Brain Voyager software. Spatial smoothing was omitted for data 
analyzed using multivariate techniques. Subjects' functional data were aligned with their T1-
weighted anatomical volumes and transformed into standardized Talairach space. 
We created design matrices for each subject by convolving the task events with a 
canonical hemodynamic response function (double gamma, including a positive γ function and a 
smaller, negative γ function to reflect the BOLD undershoot). For the task events, the 
presentation of each stage of a scenario was modeled as a boxcar function spanning the duration 
of the stage’s RSVP. The punishment decision phase of the task was modeled from the display of 
the punishment scale to the time of response. The inter-stimulus math task was modeled from the 
start of the ISI to the time of subject response. We also inserted 6 estimated motion parameters 
(X, Y, and Z translation and rotation) as nuisance regressors into each design matrix.  
For our first-level analysis of the functional imaging data, we created six distinct general 
linear models (GLMs) for each subject's data, with each GLM created to address a different 
question and avoid co-linearity issues between regressors.  Specifically, to assess the evaluative 
process for Harm and Mental State separately, the first (GLM1) modeled each stage of the task 
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as well as the inter-stimulus math task, with the identification of Stage B and Stage C classified 
as either Mental State or Harm based on which occurred at that stage on that trial. In order to 
model the cognitive systems recruited by the different task stages, regardless of the information 
presented at the stage, we created GLM2, which was the same as GLM1 except that we did not 
reclassify Stage B and Stage C into Mental State and Harm. To identify regions sensitive to the 
different Harm levels, the third (GLM3) modeled only the Harm component, but with different 
regressors for each level of Harm in the sentence. The fourth (GLM4) did the same level-based 
regressor analysis for Mental State. To identify regions that are sensitive to the integration of 
Harm and Mental State, the fifth (GLM5) modeled 'Stage C' only, categorizing the stage both in 
terms of whether the scenario had a culpable (P, R, or N) or blameless (B) mental state and 
whether the harm contained was high (life altering/death) or low (de minimis/substantial). We 
designed GLM5 to contain four cells in order to maximize the number of trials per cell so as to 
assure a more reliable estimate of the condition parameter for each subject. We divided the 
Mental State conditions into Blameless and Culpable (the latter of which combines the 
purposeful, reckless, and negligent mental states) because that reflects the most meaningful legal 
demarcation in our conditions. For the Harm condition we performed a median split such that we 
had High and Low Harm conditions. We achieved qualitatively similar results if we demarcated 
the Mental State using a median split of conditions as well. Note that we modeled only Stage C 
for GLM5 because this is the first stage at which the integration of harm and mental state could 
occur. 
All GLMs were created using z-transformed time course data.  Second-order random 
effects analyses were conducted on the beta weights calculated for each subject. To control for 
multiple comparisons when performing whole-brain analyses we applied a False-Discovery Rate 
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(FDR) threshold of q < 0.05 (with c(V) = 1) and a 10 functional voxel cluster size minimum. In 
the case a conjunction analysis was used, we applied a minimum test statistic (Nichols et al., 
2005).  For visualization purposes, some analyses display BOLD signal timecourses extracted 
using a deconvolution analysis. For this analysis we defined a set of 10 finite impulse response 
(FIR) regressors for each condition and ran first-level region of interest (ROI) GLMs using the 
FIR regressors. While we display standard errors of the mean for these time courses, these are 
strictly for the purpose of visualizing the variance and shape of the hemodynamic responses. In 
order to avoid non-independent selective analysis of the data (the “double-dipping” problem) 
these timecourse data were not subjected to inferential statistical analyses. When we perform 
post-hoc analyses on regions identified in the whole-brain analyses we control for multiple 
comparisons again using a FDR threshold of q < 0.05.  
For the multi-voxel pattern analysis (MVPA), z-transformed BOLD signals at each time 
point for each condition were extracted and activity was centered as a function of condition such 
that there was no longer a mean univariate difference between event types. Independently for 
each ROI, subject, and time point, we performed a leave-one-run-out procedure: all but one run 
of data were used to train a linear support vector machine (Chang and Lin, 2001) that was then 
tested on the held-out run; this process was iterated until all runs had served as the test data once 
(4-fold cross-validation). Classifier proportion correct was aggregated to determine an ROI-, 
subject-, and time point-specific MVPA result. Within an ROI, MVPA results across time points 
were concatenated to form an ROI- and subject-specific event-related MVPA (er-MVPA) time 
course (Tamber-Rosenau et al., 2013) with perfect performance at 1.0. The set of subject er-
MVPA time courses was compared with chance at the mean peak time point across ROIs via a 
one-tailed t test (because below-chance classification is not interpretable). The peak time point 
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occurred 12 seconds after the decision prompt or 10 seconds after the start of the stage RSVP; 
which corresponds, on average, to 6 seconds following the mean decision time and the end of the 
stage RSVP, respectively). Whole brain searchlight analysis was performed only at the peak time 
points due to practical computation limitations. For the searchlight analysis we defined a 
spherical 3mm region extending from every cortical voxel and performed the same MVPA 
procedure described above in each subject and in each of these spherical regions across the brain. 
As with the whole-brain univariate inquiries we performed an FDR (q < 0.05) correction for 
multiple comparisons. Chance MVPA performance was empirically estimated for each analysis 
in order to rule out artifactual above-chance performance (as a result of, for instance, imperfect 
balance of number of correct trials of each type per run). We achieved this by running 200 
iterations of the classifier on data using randomly shuffled condition labels for the training set. 
Due to practical limitations we used the mean chance performance calculated on the ROI based 
MVPA analysis as chance for the searchlight analysis.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Behavioral Results 
Figure 2A shows subjects’ punishment ratings as a function of both Harm and Mental 
State levels. Using a repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA), the results indicate main 
effects of both the actor's mental state (F(3,66) = 199.46, p < 0.001) and the resulting harm 
(F(3,66) = 414.90, p < 0.001) on punishment ratings. There was also an interaction between the 
levels of Harm and Mental State (F(9,198) = 22.096, p < 0.001), such that the increase in 
punishment ratings with higher harm levels is greater under more culpable states of mind. This 
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interaction is present even when the blameless condition is excluded from the analysis (F(6,144) 
= 3.84, p < 0.005). 
Figures 2B and 2C show subjects’ mean reaction times (RTs) at the decision phase as a 
function of Mental State and Harm levels, respectively. Both Mental State and Harm level 
display a quadratic relationship with RT, wherein the intermediate levels of Mental State and 
Harm are more time consuming for subjects at the decision stage than the extreme levels of 
Mental State and Harm (Figures 2B-C). We explicitly tested this relationship by means of a 
repeated measures ANOVA with within- subjects quadratic contrasts for both Mental State 
(F(1,22) = 19.87, p < 0.001) and Harm (F(1,22) = 26.65, p < 0.001).  
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Fig. 2: Results of Behavioral Analyses 
 
Note: A. Mean punishment ratings as a function of Mental State and Harm level. B-C. Mean 
centered RT as a function of Mental State and Harm level. Error bars display +/- SEM. D. 
Subjects’ punishment ratings are primarily determined by the product of the Harm*MS 
interaction term and the Harm term. Subjects’ weightings of these two terms show a strong 
negative correlation. E. There is a negative correlation between subjects’ weightings of the 
MS*Harm interaction and the Mental State term. P, Purposeful; R, Reckless; N, Negligent; B, 
Blameless. F. There is a positive correlation between subjects’ weighting of the Mental State and 
Harm terms.  
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To understand the contributions of harm and mental state and the interaction of these two 
factors in punishment decision-making, we compared behavioral models that could ostensibly 
account for how individuals weigh and integrate these factors in their decisions. As displayed in 
Table 2, the model with Harm, Mental State, and interaction components was identified as the 
best model using AIC. The standardized model parameters indicate that, by a large margin, 
subjects weight the interaction component most heavily in their punishment response, followed 
by Harm and then Mental State. As seen in Figure 2A, the nature of this interaction is a super-
additive effect between Mental State and Harm. Mean r-square across subjects using the selected 
model was 0.66. The importance of the interaction of Harm and Mental State in punishment 
decisions is also illustrated by a regression analysis of individual subjects’ weighing of each of 
the three components. Specifically, the most heavily weighted component – the interaction – 
displayed a strong negative correlation with both Harm (r = -0.90, p < 0.0001, Figure 2D) and 
Mental State (r = -0.67, p = 0.0005, Figure 2E), while Harm and Mental State showed a positive 
correlation (r = 0.43, p = 0.041, Figure 2F). These results suggest that subjects who tend to 
weigh heavily the interaction term in their punishment decisions do not put much weight on the 
Harm or Mental State components alone.  
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Table 2: Behavioral Modelling for the fMRI Experiment 
Model AIC Model Components beta SE p 
1 7962 Mental State 0.45 0.02 0.000 
2 7842 Harm 0.60 0.02 0.000 
3 7659 Mental State * Harm 0.75 0.03 0.000 
4 7673 Mental State + 0.45 0.02 0.000 
    Harm 0.60 0.02 0.000 
5 7637 Harm + 0.20 0.03 0.000 
    Mental State*Harm 0.63 0.02 0.000 
6 7660 Mental State + -0.04 0.03 1.000 
    Mental State*Harm 0.78 0.02 0.000 
7 7631 Mental State + 0.15 0.03 0.005 
    Harm + 0.30 0.03 0.000 
    Mental State*Harm 0.47 0.04 0.000 
 
Note: Bolded model selected as the best model by means of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
All beta coefficients standardized. 
 
fMRI Data 
The analysis of the imaging data was directed at addressing three primary questions. 
First, to what extent do Mental State and Harm evaluation engage separable or common neural 
processes? Second, what regions support the integration of these two components? Third, is the 
punishment decision neurally separable from Harm/Mental State evaluations and, to the extent 
that it is, what brain regions are associated with it? 
 
fMRI Data: Evaluation of Mental State and Harm Information 
 
Identified here are those regions that show preferential engagement for the evaluation of 
the Mental State component, and subsequently, those regions that show preferential engagement 
 28 
for the Harm component. In both cases the initial region identification is followed by analyses 
that seek to provide supporting evidence for the involvement of the identified brain regions in the 
evaluation of that component and to characterize the nature of that region’s involvement.  
To identify regions preferentially involved in mental state evaluation we performed a 
contrast of Mental State evaluation > Harm evaluation using GLM1 (which modeled all stages, 
with Stage B and Stage C collapsed across either Mental State or Harm, though we achieved 
qualitatively similar results when Mental State or Harm activity were solely derived from Stage 
B). The resulting statistical parametric map (SPM) revealed areas of differential activation in 
regions associated with a Theory of Mind (ToM) network thought to be involved in interpreting 
others’ mind (Gallagher and Frith, 2003; Carrington and Bailey, 2009) including bilateral 
temporoparietal junction (TPJ), bilateral dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), and bilateral 
superior temporal sulcus (STS) (left panel Figure 3A-C, Table 3) as well as posterior cingulate 
cortex (PCC) (left panel Figure 3A-C, Table 3). We also observed activations in a number of 
other regions not commonly associated with a ToM network, including bilateral caudate, right 
middle temporal gyrus (Mid. TG), left medial frontal gyrus (Med. FG), and left inferior frontal 
gyrus (IFG) (Table 3). 
 
 29 
Fig. 3: fMRI Analysis of Evaluation of Mental State and Harm Information 
 
Note: A-C. Left panel displays SPMs results of the contrast Mental State – Harm, highlighting A. 
TPJ and PCC, B. DMPFC, and C. STS. Right panel displays activity in the respective ROIs 
(when the ROI is bilateral we only show the left) as a function of Mental State level. D-E. Left 
panel displays SPMs results of the contrast Harm – Mental state illustrating D. PI and Left OFC, 
and E. L IPL. Right panel displays activity in the respective ROIs as a function of Harm level. 
SPM, Statistical Parametric Map; TPJ, Temporoparietal Junction; PCC, Posterior Cingulate 
Cortex; DMPFC, Dorsomedial Prefrontal Cortex; STS, Superior Temporal Sulcus; ROIs, 
Regions of Interest; PI, Posterior Insula; OFC, Orbitofrontal Cortex; IPL, Inferior Parietal 
Lobule; LPFC, Lateral Prefrontal Cortex.    
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Table 3: Mental State Evaluation at Time of Evaluation 
 
Note: Whole brain contrast corrected at q(FDR) = 0.05. 'Linear Contrast' column presents results 
of repeated measures ANOVA with a linear contrast. 'Contrast with MS difficulty' column 
presents the results of a repeated measures ANOVA with a contrast based on Mental State 
difficulty (Ginther et al., 2014; Shen et al., 2011). Light shading indicates significance at p < 0.1. 
If both contrasts account for the data, dark shading indicates that the darkly shaded is 
significantly more consistent with the data than the other contrast (Rosnow and Rosenthal, 
1996). 'MS Decoding column presents the results of a t-test compared to chance level decoding 
of Mental State level in each region. All sizes are in units of functional voxels. All ROI analyses 
corrected for multiple comparisons. TG, Temporal Gyrus; FG, Frontal Gyrus; IFG, Inferior 
Frontal Gyrus. 
 
In each identified region of interest (ROI), the relationship between the level of Mental 
State and brain activity was further characterized by considering three possibilities: 1) activity in 
the region is linearly related to the level of Mental State – consistent with the commensurate 
increase in punishment amount seen with increases in the level of Mental State; 2) activity in the 
region is related to the difficulty subjects have in evaluating the offender’s state of mind – 
reflecting demand or time-on-task effects; and 3) each Mental State is coded by a distinct pattern 
of neural ensembles within a given brain region rather than by the overall level of activation of 
that region. 
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To examine the extent to which the Mental State activations were consistent with the 
linear and/or difficulty-based models, we ran a repeated measures ANOVA on beta parameters 
extracted using GLM4 (which modeled the different Mental State levels, collapsed across Stage 
B and Stage C), using both a simple linear contrast and a contrast based on Mental State 
evaluation difficulty. The latter was based on subjects’ difficulty in classifying different mental 
states as belonging to each P, R, N, and B categories as assessed in prior studies from our group 
(Shen et al., 2011; Ginther et al., 2014). Specifically, we defined difficulty as 1-classification 
accuracy to arrive at the following difficulty values: P: .22, R: .60, N: .52, B: .12. (Note that the 
quadratic fit of the classification accuracy data is similar to the RT data at response time for 
Mental States (see Fig. 2B). We chose to use the former fit for the fMRI data because it more 
likely reflects the process that is taking place at the evaluative than at the decisional stages. 
However, the results are similar if RTs are used.) This pair of analyses tested if either model 
significantly accounted for the data. If a region was sensitive to both contrasts, we examined 
whether one of the contrasts accounted for significantly more of the variance in the data 
(Rosnow and Rosenthal, 1996). In a final analysis, MVPA was used to assess whether distinct 
neural ensembles in the identified ROIs encoded the different Mental State levels by training and 
testing a support vector machine (SVM) on brain activity during the period of evaluation. Note 
that for all MVPA analyses univariate differences were first subtracted out (see methods) so that 
the analysis was specific for multivariate patterns. 
As displayed in Table 3 and visualized in Figure 3A-C, TPJ, STS, and DMPFC―the 
regions comprising the putative ToM network (TPJ, STS, DMPFC)―are accounted for by the 
difficulty model with the exception of right STS. Other than L IFG, no other region showed 
activity consistent with the mentalization difficulty model. By contrast, the linear model better 
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accounted for the activation profile in the PCC (Table 3, Figure 3A). Finally, we did not find 
above-chance levels of classification accuracy in any of the identified ROIs (Table 3). Taken 
together, these results suggest that regions engaged by the evaluation of Mental State show 
patterns of activations consistent with both an effect of mentalization difficulty–in the case of 
TPJ, STS, and DMPFC–and with the amount of culpability–in the case of the PCC.  
The same set of analyses was performed to identify regions that may be implicated in the 
evaluation of Harm. We again used GLM1 to identify regions displaying greater activity for the 
Harm evaluation compared to the Mental State evaluation by means of the reverse contrast from 
the prior analysis (Harm Evaluation > Mental State Evaluation). This analysis identified bilateral 
posterior insula (PI), the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL), the left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 
left fusiform gyrus, and left lateral prefrontal cortex (LPFC) as showing preferential engagement 
for evaluation of harm statements (left panel Figure 3D-E, Table 3).  
In each of these regions we next characterized the relationship between the different 
categories of Harm and neural activity. As with Mental State, both a linear and quadratic 
relationship were considered, consistent with the commensurate increase in punishment and 
evaluation difficulty, respectively, as well as the possibility that MVPA would reveal distinct 
patterns of neural ensembles for each Harm level. Because we did not have an independent 
measure of evaluation difficulty as a function of Harm level, we used a quadratic ([1- 1 1 -1]) 
pattern under the premise that intermediate harms are more difficult to evaluate than harms at the 
boundary, a pattern that is consistent with the RT distribution at the time of decision. As with 
Mental State, we achieve qualitatively similar results if we use a contrast based on decision RT.  
We compared how well these three potential relationships explained the pattern of 
activation in each Harm ROI. Activity in the OFC was best accounted for by the quadratic 
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relationship such that there was greater activation for the intermediate harms than the extreme 
harms (Figure 3D, Table 4), while right lateral prefrontal cortex activity was best accounted for 
by a negative linear contrast (Table 4). As with Mental State, we used MVPA to examine 
whether the identified regions displayed distinct patterns of activation as a function of the level 
of Harm and found no evidence that they did (Table 4). Thus, only two of the Harm ROIs 
exhibited any of the predicted functional relationships. Most of the other ROIs – namely bilateral 
PI, left IPL, and left fusiform gyrus – showed an unexpected activity pattern in which the highest 
category of Harm – death – exhibited less activity than the three other Harm levels (Figure 3D-E, 
Table 4). We speculate that this pattern may reflect vicarious somatosensation of pain (Rozzi et 
al., 2008; Singer et al., 2009; Keysers et al., 2010) in which representations of others’ pain or 
bodily harm can be imagined in all Harm levels except death. 
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Table 4: Harm Evaluation at Time of Evaluation  
 
Note: Table 4. Regions showing significant activation for Harm evaluation as contrasted with 
Mental State evaluation. Whole brain contrast corrected at q(FDR) = 0.05. 'Linear Contrast' 
column presents results of repeated measures ANOVA with a linear contrast. 'Quadratic 
Contrast' column presents the results of a repeated measures ANOVA with a quadratic contrast 
as a proxy of Harm evaluation difficulty. 'Death Cond. Sig. Lower' column presents the results of 
a repeated measures ANOVA with the contrast [-1 -1 -1 3]. Light shading indicates significance 
at p < 0.1. If more than one contrast accounts for the data, dark shading indicates the contrast 
accounts for significantly more of the variance in the data than the other two contrasts (Rosnow 
and Rosenthal, 1996). 'Harm Decoding' column presents the results of a t-test compared to 
chance level decoding of Harm level in each region. All ROI analyses corrected for multiple 
comparisons. TG, Temporal Gyrus; FG, Frontal Gyrus; IFG, Inferior Frontal Gyrus. LPFC, 
Lateral Prefrontal Cortex; OFC, Orbitofrontal Cortex. 
 
Directly contrasting Harm and Mental State does not identify brain regions that may be 
commonly activated by the evaluation of the two components. In order to identify commonly 
recruited regions, we carried out a conjunction analysis of contrasts that removed activity related 
to reading and comprehending text (by subtracting Stage A) and any potential decision-related 
activity (by subtracting the Decision stage); i.e. 1. Mental State > Stage A, 2. Harm > Stage A, 3. 
Mental State > Decision, and 4. Harm > Decision. This conjunction of contrasts revealed shared 
positive activations in bilateral STS and bilateral TPJ (Table 5, Figure 4A-B). Both STS and TPJ 
regions overlap substantially or entirely with the regions identified in the Mental State > Harm 
analysis (Cf. Tables 3, 5; Figures 3A, C; Figures 4A-B).  As the timecourses in Figure 4A-B 
reveal, in each of these regions Mental State evaluation shows greater activation than Harm 
evaluation, but there is also pronounced activation associated with Harm evaluation. To test 
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whether these common activations represent recruitment of shared resources or instead reflect 
the recruitment of distinct neural ensembles we performed MVPA in the identified regions to see 
if a pattern classifier could decode whether subjects were evaluating Harm or Mental State at the 
time of the evaluation. We observed marked decoding in both TPJ and STS (Figure 4C), 
providing evidence for the conclusion that Harm and Mental State evaluation engage overlapping 
regions but employ largely distinct neural ensembles.  
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Fig. 4: fMRI Analysis of Regions Common to Mental State and Harm Evaluation 
 
 
Note: A-B. Deconvolution timecourses of activity in A. temporoparietal junction (TPJ), and B. 
superior temporal sulcus (STS). Insets illustrate the locations of the relevant regions C. Event 
related MVPA timecourses illustrating mean classification accuracy as a function of time and 
ROI. Colored timecourses represent above chance classification. MS, Mental State; Sent A, 
Sentence A; Dec, Decision Stage. 
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Table 5: Mental State and Harm Evaluation vs. Other Task 
Components  
 
Talairach 
Coordinates   
 
MS vs. Harm 
Decoding  
Region X Y Z t p Size t p 
R STS 51 -19 -5 7.50 
<1.0E-
6 96 4.95 1.4E-4 
R TPJ 48 -46 19 4.84 7.7E-5 35 5.54 5.1E-5 
R STS2 45 5 -17 5.75 9.0E-6 29 2.63 0.02 
R Insula 36 5 10 -4.59 1.4E-4 15 0.73 0.47 
R Motor 12 5 37 -4.04 5.5E-4 17 1.74 0.11 
L STS -51 -19 -5 6.63 1.0E-6 52 3.95 1.2E-3 
L TPJ -48 -52 13 6.21 1.0E-6 110 8.03 7.0E-7 
Note: Regions sensitive to a conjunction contrast of Mental State compared to 'Stage A' and 
'Stage D' as well as Harm compared to 'Stage A' and 'Stage D'. Whole brain contrast corrected at 
q(FDR) = 0.05. Right two columns present results of analysis testing whether across subject 
classification accuracy between Harm and Mental State was significantly greater than chance. 
Shading indicates statistically significant declassification (corrected for multiple comparisons). 
 
To assess whether the ROI analysis may have missed brain regions involved in 
processing Mental State or Harm evaluation, we also tested for such regions using whole brain 
analyses that looked for patterns of activations consistent with the various processing patterns 
described in the above analysis. As such, this whole-brain analysis removes the antecedent step 
of requiring a significant difference in activations for Mental State compared to Harm, or vice 
versa. For Mental State, in addition to the same PCC region identified in the Mental State > 
Harm analysis (Cf. Table 3 and Table 6) we identified positive linear relationships in left medial 
prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and left superior temporal gyrus (STG) (Table 6). The whole-brain 
approach did not reveal any areas with the quadratic or searchlight MVPA analyses. In the case 
of Harm, no regions were observed with a whole-brain linear, quadratic, MVPA, or vicarious 
somatosensation-based [1 1 1 -3] analysis. 
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Table 6: Linear Whole-Brain Contrast of 
Mental State 
 
Talairach 
Coordinates   
 Region X Y Z t p Size 
PCC -3 -49 25 4.00 1.6E-4 19 
L MPFC -6 56 34 5.00 4.0E-6 38 
L STG -46 17 -14 5.52 1.0E-6 62 
 
Note: Regions displaying a linear relationship between level of Mental State and brain activity in 
a whole-brain contrast. Whole brain contrast corrected at q(FDR) = 0.05. MPFC, Medial 
Prefrontal Cortex; STG, Superior Temporal Gyrus. 
 
Taken together, these results not only reveal that the neural substrates processing Harm 
and Mental State evaluations are largely dissociable, they also indicate that brain regions 
involved in each of these two factors may code distinct properties of the factor, such as the 
difficulty of its evaluation or its amount of culpability or Harm.  
fMRI Data: Integration of the Harm and Mental State Components 
 
The above results indicate that separable neural systems are recruited to evaluate Harm 
and Mental State information. Even regions showing common activations for Harm and Mental 
State―specifically the STS and TPJ―display evidence that distinct neural ensembles are 
recruited for the evaluation of the two components. This raises the question of what regions may 
support the real-time neural integration of these two components. To answer this question, we 
isolated regions that were preferentially recruited at Stage C compared to Stage B (Stage C – 
Stage B) since Stage C is the first stage at which integration can happen as subjects have access 
to both the Mental State and the Harm. However, given that Stage C also involves greater 
working memory (WM) demand than Stage B, it is likely that at least some of the regions 
isolated may be related to WM per se rather than the integration of Harm and Mental State. We 
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can address this issue with the following contrast ((Stage C – Stage B) – (Stage B – Stage A)), as 
the Stage B - A component of this contrast should also compare two stages with similarly 
different WM demands. The resulting SPM of this contrast revealed activation indicative of 
integration in bilateral amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), right dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex (DLPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), and right middle occipital gyrus (Table 7, 
Figure 5A-C), with most of these regions previously identified as putative sites of integration of 
information (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015; Yu et al., 2015). 
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Fig. 5: fMRI Analysis of Integration Regions 
 
Note: A. Medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), B. dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), and C. bilateral amygdala display activity consistent with integration 
using the following contrast: (Stage C-Stage B) – (Stage B – Stage A). D. The amygdala (left 
illustrated) displays an interaction activation profile in which there is an effect of harm level 
when the actor has a culpable mental state. E. There is a positive correlation between the strength 
of the interaction in the amygdala and how much subjects weighted the interaction term in their 
punishment decisions (r = .4195, p = .046).  
 
To more precisely characterize the role these regions play in integrating Harm and 
Mental State, we sought evidence of differential activation as a function of an interaction 
between level of Harm and Mental State that parallels the behavioral results (i.e. a super-additive 
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effect of culpable Mental State and severe Harm). Specifically, using GLM5 (see Methods) we 
modeled conditions based on a 2 x 2 factorial design of Mental State (Blameless, Culpable) and 
Harm (Low, High) at Stage C. As displayed in Table 7 and Figure 5D, both left and right 
amygdala display a robust interaction mirroring the super-additive behavioral effect of Mental 
State and Harm integration (see Figure 2A).  No other regions were observed when carrying out 
this interaction analysis on whole brains. 
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Table 7: Integration Regions 
 
Talairach 
Coordinates    
Superadditive 
Harm x MS Intx. 
Pun. 
Decoding (C)  
Region X Y Z t p Size F p F p 
R Mid. Occ. Gyr. 39 -70 1 4.46 
<1.0E-
6 34 0.00 1.00 -0.06 0.96 
PCC -3 -22 28 6.41 
<1.0E-
6 774 0.05 1.00 0.52 0.61 
R DLPFC 30 32 40 4.10 
<1.0E-
6 26 3.09 0.10 0.76 0.45 
R Amygdala 24 -13 -14 5.53 
<1.0E-
6 72 12.46 <1.0E-6 -0.49 0.63 
MPFC 6 41 7 6.11 
<1.0E-
6 380 0.05 1.00 0.57 0.57 
L Amygdala -21 -7 -20 6.53 
<1.0E-
6 52 7.84 0.01 -0.41 0.69 
Note: Regions showing evidence of supporting Mental State and Harm integration by means of 
the contrast (Stage C > Stage B) > (Stage B > Stage A). Whole brain contrast corrected at 
q(FDR) = 0.05. ‘Superadditive Harm x MS Intx.’ columns show statistics for an ROI based 
analysis in each region identifying patterns consistent with a superadditive interaction similar to 
that displayed in the behavioral results and a non-specific Mental State by Harm interaction, 
respectively. 'Pun. Decoding (C)' reports the significance of MVPA decoding of punishment 
amount during Stage C in each of these regions compared to chance. Shading indicates 
statistically significant interaction effect. All ROI analyses corrected for multiple comparisons. 
The PCC region is rostral to and does not overlap with the region identified in the Mental 
State>Harm contrast (Cf. Figure 3A, 5A; Tables 3, 5, and 7), just as the present MPFC region 
does not overlap with the left MPFC region identified in the whole brain linear effect of Mental 
State analysis (Cf. Tables 6 and 7). Mid. Occ. Gyr.. Middle Occipital Gyrus. 
 
That the pattern of amygdalae activity mirrors subjects’ punishment behavior is evidence 
for a relationship between the amygdalae and the ultimate punishment decision. To further 
explore this potential brain-behavior relationship, we examined how subjects’ individual 
differences in amygdalae response correlated with their differences in weighting the interaction 
factor in their punishment decisions. Specifically, for each subject we calculated an index of the 
strength of the interaction in subjects’ amygdalae activity ((Culpable High Harm – Blameless 
High Harm)) – (Culpable Low Harm – Blameless Low Harm)) and compared it with the 
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interaction beta weights calculated for each subject. If the interaction effect observed in the 
amygdalae were associated with the interaction effect observed in the behavior, we would expect 
that the strength of the interaction displayed in subjects’ amygdalae to predict the strength of the 
interaction displayed in subjects’ behavior. Consistent with this hypothesis, we found that 
subjects’ interaction indices in the amygdalae were positively correlated with the interaction term 
(r = .42, p = .044, Figure 5E). 
fMRI Data: The Punishment Decision Stage 
 
Brain regions involved in the decisional stage of a punishment judgment should display 
at least the two following characteristics: 1) preferential activation during the punishment 
decision stage of the task, and 2) a functional relationship between brain activity during the time 
of the punishment decision and the outcome of the decision.  
To search for such regions, we first identified those meeting the first criterion and then 
limited our analysis for the second criterion to the regions identified in the first step. To test the 
first criterion, we extracted subjects' beta values for each task stage and used GLM2 (which 
modeled each of the different task stages) to perform a conjunction analysis of the decision stage 
of the task compared to each of the other task conditions, namely Stage A, Mental State and 
Harm Evaluation, and the ISI math task. We included the ISI task in the conjunction as it is the 
only other task condition that involves response selection. Given the unique demands of Stage D 
compared to other task components this analysis expectedly revealed preferential activity in a 
number of regions, including right DLPFC, left ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (VLPFC), bilateral 
IFG, and visual and motor areas (Figure 6A, Table 8). Each of these regions displayed activity 
that was significantly correlated with RT at the decision screen (Table 8).  
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Fig. 6: fMRI Analysis of Decision Regions 
 
Note: A. SPM showing regions (arrow points to right DLPFC) with preferential engagement at 
the time of decision by means of a 4-way conjunction between the time of decision and the other 
task components (see Results). B-C.  Decoding of punishment rating in the right DLPFC region. 
The er-MVPA timecourses plot classification accuracy of the voxels in the identified right 
DLPFC region on punishment rating as well on the level of Mental State and Harm at B. the time 
of the decision and C. Stage C. DLPFC, Dorsolateral Prefrontal Cortex; MS, Mental State.  
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Table 8: Regions Showing Significant Activation for The Conjunction Contrast Between 
'Stage D' And All Other Task Stages 
 
Note: Whole brain contrast corrected at q(FDR) = 0.05. 'Corr. with Dec. RT' column tests 
whether there is a significant effect of 'Stage D' RT on activity in the identified regions. 'Main 
Effect of Pun. Amt.' column tests for a main effect on activity in each ROI as a function of 
subjects' punishment quantities. 'Pun. Decoding (D)' reports the significance of MVPA decoding 
of punishment amount during the decision stage in each of these regions compared to chance. 
'Pun. Decoding (C)' reports the same for Stage C.  Shading shows statistically significant 
correlation with decision RT, statistically significant main effect of punishment amount, or 
significant punishment amount classification accuracy. All ROI analyses corrected for multiple 
comparisons. FG, Frontal Gyrus; VLPFC, Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex; RT, Reaction Time. 
 
To test the second criterion, i.e. to assess whether activity in any of the brain regions 
isolated above was linked to the decision of whether or how much to punish at the time of the 
decision, we sought to identify relationships between brain activity and decisional metrics using 
both univariate and multivariate approaches. First, we found no robust correlation between 
activity amplitude and level of punishment (Table 8), replicating Buckholtz et al. (2008). This 
may not be surprising given that subjects may engage in similar decisional reasoning across 
punishment ratings. Another possibility, assessed with MVPA, is that different neural ensembles 
in the DLPFC encode different punishment ratings. To address this issue, for each region we 
divided subjects’ punishment decisions into quartiles and trained and tested a classifier on the 
activity corresponding with punishment decisions falling into each of the quartiles. Of the 
regions identified by the first criterion, we observed significant decoding of the trial by trial 
punishment amount in only right DLPFC and visual cortex (Table 8, Figure 6B). As some have 
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cautioned that differences in subject-by-subject RT can induce false positive decoding (Todd et 
al., 2013) we also performed the original analysis after regressing out differences in activity 
associated with differences in trial by trial reaction time and still observed significant decoding 
in the DLPFC ROI (t = 1.74, p = 0.048 one tailed) and in the visual region (t = 2.831, p = 0.005 
one tailed). We hypothesize that decoding in the visual ROI is associated with subjects’ visual 
evaluation of the punishment scale and response.  
Importantly, the involvement of the DLPFC ROI in punishment rating is relatively 
specific, as this ROI failed to decode either the different Mental State or Harm levels (t = 0.69, p 
= 0.25 and t = 0.90, p = 0.19 one tailed, respectively, Figure 6B). This right DLPFC ROI also 
overlaps with the right DLPFC ROI previously hypothesized to be involved in the decision to 
punish (Buckholtz et al., 2008; Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). Previous studies investigating 
second and third-party punishment decision-making have frequently found punishment decision-
making to selectively engage the right as opposed to the left DLPFC (Sanfey, 2003; Knoch et al., 
2006; Buckholtz et al., 2008; Baumgartner et al., 2014). Here punishment classification accuracy 
was similarly right-lateralized, as we failed to find any decoding (t = 0.94, p = 0.18 one tailed) in 
a region with the same y and z coordinates in the left hemisphere.  
In a final analysis we examined whether this same right DLPFC ROI encoded 
punishment levels during Stage C as well. While the task is designed to interfere with decision-
making at Stage C, subjects most likely make their first approximations of the punishment 
decision at Stage C, after they have been presented with both Harm and MS information. 
Furthermore, analysis of the punishment decision at Stage C has the added benefit over Stage D 
of not having any potential motor response confound. Thus, using the same methodological 
approach previously applied to Stage D, we tested each of the regions identified by the 
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integration and decision contrasts (Tables 7 and 8, respectively). Of the regions tested, the only 
one to decode punishment level was the right DLPFC region identified in the decision contrast 
(Figure 6C, Tables 7 and 8), thereby further implicating this brain region in assignment of 
punishment. And once again, this region does not seem to encode either Mental State or Harm 
level. It is also noteworthy that the visual area that survived MVPA analysis at Stage D failed to 
decode at Stage C, a result that supports our hypothesis that its decoding at the Decision stage is 
due to subjects’ visual evaluation of the scale.   
 
DISCUSSION  
Our behavioral results indicate that punishment decisions are primarily driven by the 
interaction between Mental State and Harm. This interaction is characterized by a super-additive 
relationship between the component factors. This is consistent with studies showing that 
intentionality augments the negative valence associated with the same harmful outcome (Gray 
and Wegner, 2008) and can even augment a person’s quantification of the severity of a harmful 
outcome (Ames and Fiske, 2013; 2015). Using functional imaging we sought to parse how these 
two components – mental state and harm – converge into a punishment response which is 
defined by their interaction.  
The data indicate that Mental State and Harm evaluation are distinct processes that 
engage separable neural resources. In regards to Mental State, a group of regions consisting of 
TPJ, DMPFC, and STS were preferentially engaged by the evaluation of the offender’s 
intentions. These activations overlap with a network of regions sometimes described as a Theory 
of Mind (ToM) network (Gallagher and Frith, 2003), though the regions also co-localize with 
elements of the Default Mode Network (DMN) (Decety and Lamm, 2007; Hacker et al., 2013). 
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By implementing a parametric manipulation of Mental States, we were able to reveal a 
relationship between the difficulty of the mentalization task and the amount of activity in ToM 
regions. The parametric manipulation also provides insight into the function of the PCC. While 
the PCC is a hallmark feature of the DMN (Hacker et al., 2013), it is sometimes, but not 
consistently, linked with ToM processes (Carrington and Bailey, 2009). The present results 
indicate that while the PCC shows activation for Mental State evaluation, it displays a linear 
correlation with level of culpability instead of a relationship with mentalization difficulty. We 
hypothesize that PCC activity – perhaps in concert with the mPFC and STG – reflects the 
negative valence associated with the evaluation of the offender’s culpable mental state (Maddock 
et al., 2002; Leech and Sharp, 2014), rather than ToM processing per se. That we do not see a 
similar activation profile for Harm evaluation is consistent with prior studies showing that the 
PCC does not show augmented activity in trials containing bodily harms (Heekeren et al., 2005). 
Finally, it is interesting to note that we failed to decode in the brain the different mental states 
with MVPA despite marked univariate amplitude differences. While we acknowledge that a null 
result could reflect low power, robust decoding in other analyses (e.g. at the decision stage) 
provides some confidence that absence of decoding here is not an intrinsic lack of power. Based 
on these findings, we conclude that the distinct mental states are not encoded by distinct neural 
ensembles. Rather, the univariate results suggest that differences in mental state evaluations 
result from differential activations of the same neural ensembles.  
In regards to harm evaluation, bilateral posterior insula (PI), left inferior parietal lobule 
(IPL) and left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) show heightened activation. The functional profile of 
the PI and IPL are consistent with studies linking it with perceptions of others’ bodily pain, 
perhaps coopting the same mechanisms used to process the subject’s individual interoceptive 
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signals (Singer et al., 2004; 2009; Lamm et al., 2011). Consistent with this interpretation, these 
regions were far less activated when the outcome was death, which may be expected if the region 
is engaged in evaluation of another party’s pain. Preferential activation in OFC, on the other 
hand, may reflect its role in evaluations of relative value or cost (Wallis, 2007; Janowski et al., 
2013). Its quadratic activity pattern is consistent with this hypothesis on the premise that 
determining the magnitude (i.e., negative value) of the offense is most challenging in the 
intermediate categories.  
That Harm and Mental State evaluation deploy distinct neural systems raises the question 
of how these processes are cortically integrated. Buckholtz and Marois (2012) proposed that 
activity in mPFC and PCC in legal decision-making tasks were potentially related to their role in 
integrating these component processes, and this prediction was borne out by the present 
experiment; both mPFC and PCC are sites of integration of Harm and Mental State evaluation. 
This is consistent with studies indicating that these two brain regions act as cortical hubs 
interconnecting distinct and functionally specialized systems (Sporns et al., 2007; Buckner et al., 
2009; Bullmore and Sporns, 2012; Liang et al., 2013) – such as those engaged by the evaluation 
of an offender’s Mental State and the resulting Harm.  Our results also provide evidence that the 
right DLPFC supports integration, a finding consistent with recent work showing that disruption 
of activity in the DLPFC alters how harm and mental state are integrated into a punishment 
decision (Buckholtz et al., 2015). 
A role of the amygdalae in punishment decision-making has long been proposed 
(Buckholtz et al., 2008), though their specific function in that context has been debated. While 
Buckholtz et al. (2008) showed that harmful outcomes but not culpable mental states engaged the 
amygdalae, Yu et al. (2015) found the opposite in a second party punishment task. Yu and 
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colleagues further observed effective connectivity between the amygdala and brain regions 
associated with the integration of intention and harm, though they did not observe an interaction 
effect in the amygdala. What the present results suggest is that the role of the amygdalae in 
punishment decision-making is more complex; it is less responsive to either of the simple factors 
of Harm or Mental State than it is to the interaction of these factors. Specifically, we found that 
activation in the amygdala is defined by a super-additive interaction wherein the amygdalae 
display robust activation only in the case of a culpable Mental State and substantial Harm. Most 
strikingly, the activation profile of the amygdala mimics the pattern of subjects’ punishment 
decisions, as evidenced by the relationship between the strength of the interaction activity in 
individuals’ amygdalae and the weight that they attribute to the interaction between harm and 
mental state in rendering their decisions. These behavioral and neurobiological findings are 
remarkably consistent with recent work showing that the amygdalae’s response to gruesome 
criminal scenarios is suppressed by means of a temporoparietal-medial-prefrontal circuit when 
the harmful outcome was purely accidental (Treadway et al., 2014a). According to this account, 
the amygdalae are part of a cortico-limbic circuit that, based on the offender’s culpability, gates 
the effect of emotional arousal on punishment decisions (Treadway et al., 2014a). Such a pivotal 
role of the amygdalae in third-party punishment is in accord with the broader involvement of this 
brain region in mediating the influence of aversive states onto decision-making (Loewenstein 
and Lerner, 2002; Damasio, 2005; Phelps and LeDoux, 2005; Phelps, 2006; Miller and 
Cushman, 2013; Phelps et al., 2014).  
Finally, our results shed an important light on the role of the DLPFC in punishment 
decision-making. DLPFC activity in economic decision-making games has often been explained 
by a cognitive control account, according to which the DLPFC is promoting altruistic 
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punishment behavior towards unfair players by inhibiting the pre-potent response to act selfishly 
(Sanfey, 2003; Knoch et al., 2006). Such account of DLPFC function, however, is not easily 
reconcilable with third-party punishment studies showing greater DLPFC activity when subjects 
decided to punish (Buckholtz et al., 2008), nor with other studies that have associated activity in 
this brain region across various cognitive tasks such as working memory, analogical reasoning, 
rule-based decision-making, and amodal perceptual decision-making (Bunge et al., 2002; 
Heekeren et al., 2006; De Pisapia et al., 2007; Duncan, 2010; Hampshire et al., 2011). 
Furthermore, functional disruption of the DLPFC during third-party punishment decisions did 
not affect the severity of individuals’ punishment decisions when the actor was blameless, but 
instead disrupted how they integrated the culpability of the actor and the severity of the harm in 
their punishment decisions (Buckholtz et al., 2015). Both of these observations favor an 
“integration and selection” hypothesis of DLPFC function in third-party punishment, in which 
the DLPFC integrates multiple neural representations from cognitive sub-tasks (such as the 
evaluation of the offender harm and mental state) in order to select an appropriate behavioral 
(punishment) response (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012; Buckholtz et al., 2015). Our results are 
highly consistent with this hypothesis. DLPFC activity was not only observed at the time of the 
decision response, it also selectively coded in a neurally distributed manner the amount of 
punishment assigned to the perpetrator. Thus, the DLPFC is not simply involved in the decision 
to punish, it is also implicated in assigning the appropriate punishment based on the relative 
weighing of the mental state of the transgressor and of the harm he caused. 
In conclusion, the present study informs and extends proposed neural models of third-
party punishment (Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). Evaluation of Harm engages brain areas 
associated with affective and somatosensory processing, while Mental State evaluation recruits 
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primarily ToM/DMN circuitry. These representations are integrated in medial prefrontal cortical 
and subcortical (amygdala) structures, to be (presumably) routed to the DLPFC for the 
appropriate selection of a punishment response. Although many details remain to be worked out, 
this rigorous experiment paradigm reveals clear dissociations in the neural processing that 
underlies these complex, socially relevant, and legally important decisions. 
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2. ASSESSING THE CAUSAL ROLE OF THE AMYGDALA IN PUNISHMENT DECISIONS 
THROUGH VISUAL MASKING  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 A critical result of chapter one is the revelation of a one-to-one correspondence between 
activation in the amygdala and punishment behavior. Specifically, the super additive interaction 
between mental state and harm appears to correspond with both heightened punishment and 
heightened activation in the amygdalae. While this correspondence was purely correlational, the 
possibility of a causal brain-behavior relationship was buttressed by the relationship between 
individual subjects’ amygdala profile and their individual punishment behavior.  
That the amygdalae are critical to punishment decision-making is not, by itself, a novel 
result. Due to the fact that the amygdalae have been shown to be sensitive to aversive stimuli and 
are involved in threat detection, it is intuitive that they would be associated with punishment 
decision-making. This was initially supported by a study demonstrating the involvement of the 
amygdalae in moral judgment tasks (Heekeren et al., 2005) and more specifically so in 
Buckholtz et al. (2008), who found that activity in the amygdalae were correlated with the 
severity of a scenario’s harm. Based on these results in combination with findings that negative 
affect influences legal decision-making (Feigenson and Park, 2006), Buckholtz and Marois 
(2012) proposed that the amygdalae influence punishment decision-making by being a heuristic 
for emotional affect, which, they postulate, is correlated with harm severity.  
This proposed causal relationship between amygdala activity and punishment decision-
making posits that increased activity in this brain region should, all else being equal, lead to 
increased punishment. Observational measurements of brain activity, such as what fMRI 
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provides, are poorly situated to make inferences of this kind as they are not well suited to 
differentiate cause and effect (Smith, 2012).  
Though fMRI is not the ideal technique for making claims of causality, using advanced 
analyses that examine temporal qualities of the BOLD timecourses can provide support for a 
claim of causality as opposed to mere correlation. Specifically, analyses such as Granger 
Causality Modelling (GCM) (Roebroeck et al., 2005), Structural Equation Modelling (SEM) 
(Kim et al., 2007), and Dynamic Causal Modelling (DCM) (Friston et al., 2017) can make claims 
about the casual relationship of two variables in time.  
At least two studies have attempted to look at the causal role of the amygdala in 
punishment decisions using these types of functional imaging methods. Treadway et al. (2014) 
used GCM to identify heightened directional connectivity between the amygdala and dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex when reading scenarios where the scenario protagonist was responsible for his 
conduct. Yu et al. (2015) found further support of integration of intentionality and harm in the 
amygdala by using DCM to demonstrate evidence for directionality from temporoparietal 
junction (claimed to be sensitive to accidental conduct) and anterior insula (claimed to be 
sensitive to attempted harm) with the amygdala.   
Though analyses of this type are helpful, they have stark intrinsic limitations in their 
claims. For one, the analyses are still, ultimately, correlational. To borrow one analogy, GCM 
would indicate that sales of “Peeps” cause Easter. Further, these analyses are not able to rule out 
alternative causes for the observation, such as an independent brain region directing information 
to both the amygdala and the frontal regions analyzed in Treadway (2014) (Maziarz, 2015). 
Lesion analyses provide a framework to make more robust causal claims. Broadly 
speaking, two types of lesion analyses are used in the field. In the classic sense of a lesion study, 
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subjects with various brain damage are recruited and their brain damage is associated with a 
behavioral deficit. Studies such as these are the foundational work for modern neuropsychology 
(Cubelli and De Bastiani, 2011). However, because the lesions arise naturally or as the result of 
trauma, collecting subjects with consistently localized lesions in the region of interest is 
organizationally difficult. Ascribing varied lesions to a specific behavioral deficit is also 
challenging, but can be done in this field (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007), and modern neuroimaging 
and computational analyses have helped expand the usefulness of this approach (Bates et al., 
2003), though it remains difficult and not frequently used because recruiting the number of 
subjects necessary to draw meaningful conclusions can take years, if not decades. 
Another approach to lesion studies involves temporarily stimulating brain regions in 
order to create temporary “lesions.” This is achieved by disrupting activity using two primary 
methods: transcranial direct current stimulation (TDCS) and transcranial magnetic stimulation 
(TMS). Such an approach was used to test the role of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in 
punishment decision-making in Buckholtz et al. (2015) and has also been used in similar tasks to 
parse the role of the temporoparietal junction (TPJ). However, the depth and size of the 
amygdala make both TDCS and TMS untenable solutions for targeted stimulation of the region. 
Brain activity can, of course, also be modulated by exogenous cues or tasks. These 
stimuli and tasks, often used as functional localizers for imaging analyses, have been validated 
across numerous studies. While a number of functional localizers exist for the amygdala (e.g., 
(Hariri et al., 2002)), they are often unsuitable for use as an experimental manipulation due to the 
lack of a proper control (i.e., sham) condition and the possible interaction between the localizer 
task and the behavioral task. However, in the case of the amygdala, it is possible to induce 
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localized activation using stimuli that do not reach conscious awareness. This is done by way of 
visual masking.  
Visual masking involves the presentation of two stimuli, a target and a mask. The 
masking occurs when the mask interrupts the perception of the target (Kahneman, 1968). By 
presenting an angry or fearful face for a short duration (16 or 33ms), masked by a face 
expressing surprise for a longer duration, it is possible to induce activation in the amygdala 
without conscious perception of the target face (Whalen et al., 1998).  
Based on our knowledge that a visually masked fearful face can augment activity in the 
amygdala without conscious awareness of the stimulus, we sought to test the hypothesis that the 
amygdala was causally linked to increased punishment amounts. Subjects made punishment 
decisions while, on half of trials, a masked fearful face was presented just prior to the 
punishment decision. In order to be able to better parse the nature of the amygdala’s 
involvement, subjects evaluated scenarios that were parametrically and independently 
manipulated across level of harm and level of mental state. This allows for weights (i.e., the 
relative contribution of the different components) to be calculated, as in chapter one, for the 
contribution of harm, mental state, and their interaction on the punishment decision. By parsing 
the relative contribution of these three components in this way, our analyses may be able to 
distinguish the contribution of amygdala activation on punishment decisions  
 
METHODS 
Twenty-five subjects (10 males) were recruited to participate in the study. Subjects 
completed the task for course credit. The task design mirrored that used in chapter one (‘Parsing 
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the Behavioral and Brain Mechanisms of Third-Party Punishment’) aside from the following 
changes.  
Subjects completed only two runs, with each run comprising 18 trials. Only two runs 
were used due to pilot data indicating strong habituation effects after the first run (see below). 
Because this study was not designed with neuroimaging in mind, the math problems during the 
ISI period were replaced with fixation on a point (1500ms).  Scenarios presented on individual 
trials were manipulated across both mental state (3 levels: blameless, negligent, and purposeful) 
and harm (3 levels: de minimis, substantial, and death). Thus, in each run there were two trials 
for each cell of the 3x3 design. These two trials consisted of one treatment and one control.  
A number of steps were taken to ensure that the task provided subliminal affective 
priming: (1) adapting the masking procedures to follow those previously demonstrated to induce 
affective priming; (2) ensuring that the punishment task did not require the processing of prime 
faces (subjects were thus instructed that the image of the person was unrelated to the scenario, 
but, to explain the presence of the face, were told that the research question was how the 
presence of the face may impact their punishment decisions); (3) subjects were not told that there 
was a target face presented in addition to the mask; (4) the use of a funnel questionnaire at the 
end of the task to determine awareness of the target face; (5) trial-by-trial two-alternative forced 
choice probe to test for possible conscious perception; (6) a pilot study confirming the design 
induced changes in affect perception (Li et al., 2008). 
Adapting previously used procedures, following the last sentence, but prior to making the 
punishment decision, subjects were presented with a target face (33ms) masked with a face 
expressing surprise (800ms). A surprise face was used as the mask because its ambiguity may 
facilitate subliminal processing of the target face (Kim et al., 2003; 2004). For the treatment 
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condition the target face expressed fear, while for the control the face was neutral. This aspect to 
the design, and the accompanying timing procedures were based on (Whalen et al., 1998; Li et 
al., 2008; Kim et al., 2010), which demonstrated targeted activation in the amygdala without 
conscious awareness of the target using similar parameters. The face images were drawn from 
the KDEF database (KDEF, D. Lundqvist, A. Flykt and A. Ohman, Karolinska Hospital, 
Stockholm, Sweden). Images were colormatched, centered, and grayscaled using custom Matlab 
software.  
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Fig. 1: Task Design 
 
 
After the first run, subjects were debriefed using a funnel questionnaire adapted from Li 
et al. (2008) to determine if they had any perception of the target. Specifically, subjects were 
asked: (1) Did you see anything besides the surprise faces? (2) Did you see anything right before 
the surprise faces? (3) There was actually a flicker before the surprise faces. What did you see? 
(4) Did you see a face? (5) What expression did you see in the face?  
After the debriefing, but before the second run, subjects were informed that there was a 
target face and that during run two an additional prompt was added prior to the punishment 
rating. This prompt directed subjects to indicate whether or not they detected fear in the target 
face. This was a forced-choice probe and were thus asked to make their best guess, even if they 
could not detect the presence of a target face.  
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In a pilot study, subjects completed the same task but before making a punishment 
decision were asked to rate the affect of a surprise face on a 6 point Likert scale (1 = Extremely 
Negative, 6 = Extremely Positive). This pilot study revealed that the paradigm successfully 
induced affective priming as seen by the affect ratings provided when a happy target was used 
compared to a fearful target. However, the priming habituated by the time of the second run 
(Figure 2).  
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Fig. 2. Task Design Successfully Induces Affective Priming 
 
Note: Error bars indicate +/- 1 SEM. 
 
RESULTS 
Four of 25 subjects reported detection of a target face following run 1. Subjects’ response 
accuracy for the detection probe in the second run as well as the corresponding d’ were 
calculated. Sample accuracy and d’ were not significantly greater than .50 (t(24) = 0.0526, p = 
0.9585) and 0 (t(24) = -0.0388, p = 0.9694), respectively (Figure 3). Two subjects’ accuracy and 
d’ values indicated a likelihood of awareness of the target face’s emotional expression.  
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Fig. 3: No Conscious Perception of the Target Face 
 
 
 
To examine the effect of treatment on punishment decisions, a 3-way analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) was performed, with subject as a random effect. In addition to examining a simple 
effect of treatment, an interaction effect of treatment with mental state, harm, and their 
interaction was also examined. Results are presented in Table 1. No effects for treatment were 
observed, either as a simple effect or as an interaction. Results were not materially affected by 
excluding those subjects who self-reported awareness of the target image or otherwise evinced 
awareness in run two. Results were also not materially affected by excluding run two, on 
suspicion of habituation, as demonstrated in the pilot data (Figure 2). For purposes of 
visualization, figure 4 displays punishment ratings as a function of mental state, harm, and 
treatment.  
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Table 1: Results of ANOVA  
 
Source Sum Sq. d.f. Mean Sq. F Prob>F 
MS 1090.37 2 545.19 245.92 0.00 
Harm 1153.98 2 576.99 260.27 0.00 
Treatment 1.51 1 1.51 0.68 0.41 
MS*Harm 82.91 4 20.73 9.35 0.00 
MS*Treatment 1.28 2 0.64 0.29 0.75 
Harm*Treatment 1.63 2 0.82 0.37 0.69 
MS*Harm*Treatment 12.07 4 3.02 1.36 0.25 
Error 877.89 396 2.22 [] [] 
Total 3221.65 413 [] [] [] 
 
 64 
Fig. 4: Effect of Visual Masking of Fearful Faces on Punishment Decision 
 
Note: Error bars display +/- 1 SEM. ‘+’ indicates the presence of the treatment (fearful target), 
while ‘-‘ indicates the presence of the control (neutral target). 
 
DISCUSSION 
 We find no evidence that visually masked fearful faces affect punishment decision-
making. Null effects such as these are challenging since they prove difficult to interpret. This is 
especially true here.  
The result could, potentially, support the conclusion that activation in the amygdala does 
not feed forward to affect punishment decision-making. This would be contrary to the hypothesis 
in Buckholtz et al. (2008), Buckholtz & Marois (2012) and Ginther et al. (2016). It would also be 
directly opposing the main interpretation of the results in Treadway et al. (2014). Of course, as 
noted before, the GCA results that served as the backbone for the results in Treadway are not 
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dispositive as to the Amygdala causally driving punishment decisions since they can also be 
explained by a third region driving activation in both the Amygdala and the target region (in that 
case, DLPFC).  Instead, the result would be consistent with the amygdala’s activation reflecting 
the result of other feed forward processes. One potential interpretation is that, perhaps, the 
heightened amygdala activation relates to the mnemonic encoding of the highly aversive stimuli 
(Hamann et al., 1999).  
Unfortunately, other interpretations of the result are just as convincing, if not more so. 
For one, it is possible that the manipulation did not sufficiently augment activation in the 
amygdala to have any material effect. While the protocol was adapted from a study where 
amygdala activation was demonstrated using fMRI, the model study involved 168 blocked trials 
per condition, compared to 18 in the present study. It is thus possible that the amygdala 
activation was not sufficient to detect any difference on the punishment decision with the amount 
of power provided by the present study. Practical constraints limited our ability to have more 
trials per subject, per condition.  
At the same time, the amygdala is known to show rapid habituation effects (Zald, 2003). 
This is demonstrated not only by reduced BOLD activity in the amygdala but also by suppressed 
behavioral effects (Dijksterhuis and Smith, 2002). We further validated the presence of 
habituation effects in the present task by demonstrating a robust effect for the masked fearful 
target in run one, but no effect in run two. Nonetheless, we found similar behavioral results for 
both runs, inconsistent with the theory that habituation may, alone, account for the null result. 
Future research may seek to sacrifice the benefit of a 3x3 design where both mental state and 
harm are parametrically manipulated and instead focus on a fully between-subjects design that 
did not allow for habituation.  
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Further confounding the interpretation of the results is evidence that the amygdala may 
not be sensitive to visually masked fearful faces. Pessoa et al. (2006) found that amygdala 
activation could be detected using fMRI when using a 67ms target and when the face could be 
detected by participants but not when using a 33ms target, as used in the present study. Pessoa 
argues that the Whalen et al. (1998), which served as a model for our purposes here, did not 
accurately conclude a lack of awareness since they relied entirely on self-reports and accuracy 
and did not apply a signal detection framework to support their conclusions. Pessoa et al.’s 
conclusion is buttressed by a 2011 study observing that masked faces, as opposed to words or 
other highly valent items, did not induce affective priming (Andrews et al., 2010). 
Nonetheless, applying a signal detection framework to the present results, as called for in 
Pessoa et al. (2006), we reliably concluded a lack of awareness using the 33ms target, contrary to 
Pessoa’s account of Whalen et al. (1998). Further, our evidence demonstrating affective priming 
in the pilot study weighs against the argument presented by Andrews et al. (2011) that masked 
emotional faces will not induce affective priming and other investigators have also identified that 
masked emotional faces can induce activation in the amygdala absent conscious awareness (Kim 
et al., 2010). Ultimately, it is difficult to isolate the different explanations for the various findings 
across the literature as well as in the present null effect.  
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3. MORAL OUTRAGE DRIVES THE INTERACTION OF HARM AND CULPABLE 
INTENT IN PUNISHMENT DECISIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION  
In chapters one and two we examined the neurobiological mechanisms that give rise to 
punishment decisions. In chapters three and four we shift to examining the cognitive and 
affective states that motivate punishment behavior. As noted in the introduction, punishment of 
defectors is essential to human cooperation and is thought to be a major factor underlying our 
unparalleled social, technological, and economic achievement (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; 
Buckholtz and Marois, 2012). However, even if the adaptive benefits of TPP are by now well 
understood, much less can be said about the proximate factors that drive TPP behavior, 
especially when one considers that it is often carried out in the absence of concrete and 
immediate benefits to the punisher (Fehr and Gächter, 2002). The answer to this riddle requires 
not only understanding the external factors that trigger punishment behavior, but also elucidating 
the source of internal motivation to respond with punishment. By now, much is understood about 
the elements of norm violation to which we respond: namely the harm that was caused, and the 
extent to which that harm was produced with intent (Carlsmith et al., 2002b; Cushman, 2008b), 
consistent with real-world legal practices (LaFave et al., 1986; Shen et al., 2011). It is 
particularly the superadditive interaction between culpable mental state and substantial harm 
(Cushman, 2008a; Treadway et al., 2014b) that leads to punishment. After all, we do not punish 
bad deeds if they occur purely accidentally nor the desire to harm another if no action is taken to 
do so.  
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But confronted with a reprehensible act committed willfully, what drives a third-party 
observer to respond with punishment? While folk theory suggests that TPP results from cold-
headed reasoning – indeed, it is often considered a key rationale for the establishment of an 
uninvolved and impartial adjucator –, there is much evidence to suggest that it is also subject to 
emotional influence (Darley, Carlsmith, & Robinson, 2000; Gummerum et al., 2016; Salerno & 
Peter-Hagene, 2014). Indeed, it has been suggested that emotional responses to a crime can 
strongly predict the administered punishment (Buckholtz et al., 2008), in line with the widely 
held notion that emotions are powerful drivers of adaptive behavior (Plutchik, 1980). 
If there is now converging evidence that emotions serve as the proximate driving force(s) 
underlying TPP, there is much debate about which specific emotions may be the drivers.  Early 
work proposed the ‘CAD’ (contempt, anger, and disgust) triad hypothesis to describe the 
emotional response to social norm violations (Shweder et al., 1997). This hypothesis suggests 
that contempt is elicited in response to violations of community standards, anger by autonomy 
(individual rights) violations, and disgust by violations of divinity. While some research has 
supported this model (Rozin et al., 1999), the hypothesized ‘CAD’ associations with violations 
of community, autonomy, and divinity have been inconsistent (Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; 
Russell and Piazza, 2013). Other research suggests that it is expressions of both anger and 
disgust that strongly predict punishment severity, but their relative contributions to punishment 
behavior are often difficult to distinguish (Gutierrez et al., 2012; Piazza et al., 2013), if they are 
different at all (Nabi, 2002; Royzman et al., 2014).  
The emotion of moral outrage has emerged as a potential key player in punishment 
behavior. Early punishment research found that moral outrage mediates the effects of offense 
severity and mitigating circumstances (i.e., facts that lessened the actor’s culpability) on 
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punishment (Carlsmith et al., 2002). However, because that early study did not assess other 
emotions, the importance of moral outrage in punishment decision-making relative to contempt, 
anger, and disgust remains unknown. More recent studies have examined how moral outrage 
may relate to other emotional states. In particular, (Salerno and Peter-Hagene, 2013) indicated 
that moral outrage may be related to the combined experience of anger and disgust. However, 
because they did not independently manipulate the nature or severity of the norm violation and 
did not examine the expression of moral outrage as compared to other emotions, it remains 
unclear how norm violations, emotional states, and punishment decisions are inter-related.  
The present study is designed to understand this relationship. We achieve this by 
independently and parametrically manipulating both mental state culpability and harm severity, 
and examining how contempt, anger, disgust, and moral outrage map onto these distinct 
components. We further examined how these emotions may differentially mediate the 
relationship between the norm violation and the punishment. Because sadness is often expressed 
in response to scenarios involving harm to others (Winterich et al., 2010), we also examined its 
potential importance.  
 
METHODS 
We recruited a total of 455 participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk, with each 
receiving $6/hour as compensation. Most participants completed the survey in 5-8 minutes. 
Responses were excluded from analysis if participants failed to complete the full survey or 
incorrectly answered an attention check question, resulting in 387 participants (Ages 19 to 76 
years, Mean=37, SD=12; 52% male) ultimately included in the analysis. Sample size was chosen 
based on a power analysis indicating that roughly 400 participants were needed to obtain a power 
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of 0.95 with a moderate effect size (.25) for main effects and the interaction (a moderate effect 
size is consistent with prior studies examining mediation effects of emotion on punishment). 
After providing informed consent, participants read four scenarios (in addition to the 
‘attention check’ scenario described further below) depicting the actions of a protagonist named 
‘John’ that resulted in harm to another person. These four scenarios consisted of three anchoring 
scenarios (which were not analyzed and were indicated as practice scenarios to subjects) 
followed by the test (i.e., analyzed) scenario. The anchoring scenarios served to introduce 
subjects to the task design and the full spectrum of possible harm and mental state levels, as well 
as the punishment response scale.  
The test scenario was derived from one of 64 different scenario stems previously used by 
Ginther et al. (2016), with each stem describing a specific set of events. The 64 stems varied in 
the level of harm that John caused – from negligible to moderate to severe and to death – thus 
producing 16 stems in each of the 4 harm categories. Each of the individual 64 stems could vary 
amongst four different levels of John’s mental state in causing the harm. These mental states 
corresponded to those of purposeful, reckless, negligent, and blameless conduct as described in 
the Model Penal Code’s mental state hierarchy. With 64 different stems, each of which with four 
different possible mental states, there was a total of 256 scenarios from which the test scenario 
was randomly sampled for each subject.  
Each scenario was presented in three phases. The first phase was an introduction sentence 
that provided relevant background information about the scenario. The second and third phases 
presented either the mental state of the actor or the resulting harm, with the order of 
presentations of the mental state and harm counterbalanced across subjects (i.e harm in second 
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phase was followed by mental state in the third phase, or vice versa) (see Table 1 for an example 
fact pattern).  
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Table 1a: Illustrative Theme (Planks & Bikes): Four “Mental-State First” Variations. 
Introductory Sentence (Phase 1) 
John is hauling planks to his cabin because he is in the middle of doing carpentry work on 
his house, which abuts a public mountain bike trail. 
Mental State Sentence (Phase 2) 
Purposeful Reckless Negligent Blameless 
Mental State Mental State Mental State Mental State 
Angry with the 
mountain bikers for 
making too much 
noise when biking 
past his house, John 
desires to injure some 
bikers by dropping 
planks on their trail 
so that they would hit 
them. 
John drops some 
planks onto the trail 
without retrieving 
them because he’s 
in a rush, even 
though he is aware 
there is a 
substantial risk 
bikers will hit them 
and be injured. 
While John is 
carrying planks to 
his workshop in 
order to begin 
building new steps 
for his house, he 
drops some of the 
wood planks onto 
the bike trail 
without even 
noticing. 
While John is 
carefully carrying 
some planks from his 
shed to the backyard, 
an unexpectedly 
strong gust of wind 
causes John to 
inadvertently drop 
several planks, despite 
his best efforts not to. 
Harm Sentence (Phase 3) 
Soon after John drops the planks, two bikers pass by and they hit the planks, which causes 
them to flip over their handlebars and one of the bikers suffers serious injuries as a result. 
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Table 1b: Illustrative Theme (Planks & Bikes): Four “Harm First” Variations. 
Introductory Sentence (Phase 1) 
John is hauling planks to his cabin because he is in the middle of doing carpentry work on 
his house, which abuts a public mountain bike trail. 
Harm Sentence (Phase 2) 
Soon after John crosses the trail, two bikers pass by and they hit planks that John dropped 
onto the trail, which causes them to flip over their handlebars and one of the bikers suffers 
serious injuries as a result. 
Mental State Sentence (Phase 3) 
Purposeful Reckless Negligent Blameless 
Mental State Mental State Mental State Mental State 
Angry with the 
mountain bikers for 
making too much 
noise when biking 
past his house, John 
had desired to injure 
some bikers by 
dropping planks on 
the trail so that they 
would hit them. 
John had dropped 
some planks onto 
the trail without 
retrieving them 
because he was in a 
rush, even though 
he was aware there 
was a substantial 
risk some bikers 
would hit them and 
be injured. 
While John was 
carrying planks to 
his workshop in 
order to begin 
building new steps 
for his house, he 
had dropped some 
of the wood planks 
onto the bike trail 
without even 
noticing. 
While John was 
carefully carrying 
planks from his shed 
to the backyard, he 
slipped on some mud, 
which caused him to 
unknowingly drop 
several planks, despite 
his best efforts not to. 
Note: This example is drawn from one of 64 possible themes. Further, subjects evaluated only 
one of the possible eight scenarios from the theme they evaluated. 
 
 
Subjects’ emotions were assessed as described below at two points during each trial. 
First, after the presentation of the second phase (i.e. after presentation of either harm or mental 
state) and second, after the presentation of the third phase (i.e. after presentations of both harm or 
mental state). Thus, subjects provided two distinct emotional responses: one after only being 
aware of either the mental state or the harm, and another after becoming aware of the full 
contents of the scenario. The purpose of the first emotional assessment was to isolate the 
emotional response to harm and mental state independent of one another, whereas the second 
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assessment was used determine the emotional response to the integration of harm and mental 
state. After the second, and final, emotion assessment subjects provided a punishment rating, 
also as described below. Subjects’ progression through these steps was self-paced.  
A pilot study (N=400) in which participants were asked to rate the extent to which they 
experienced anger, disgust, contempt, moral outrage, and sadness (each on a 10-point Likert 
scale with “0” as “Not at all” and “9” as “Extremely”) after reading the scenarios established that 
collecting emotion responses in this fashion (i.e. with multiple Likert ratings) would result in 
data that could not be used to disambiguate the emotions of anger, contempt, disgust, and moral 
outrage as they relate to human punishment behavior. 
In the pilot study for this experiment (N=400), when providing the emotion ratings 
participants were asked to rate the extent to which they experienced anger, disgust, contempt, 
moral outrage, and sadness, each on a 10-point Likert scale with “0” as “Not at all” and “9” as 
“Extremely”. All emotions were presented simultaneously, with the ordering on the screen 
randomly determined, on the screen. For the punishment rating, participants were asked to 
indicate how much they felt John should be punished for his behavior on a 10-point Likert scale 
with “0” as “No punishment” and “9” as “Most severe punishment”. As part of our pre-
processing procedures we analyzed the data for collinearity in the predictors (the ratings for the 
individual emotions would serve as predictors for the punishment ratings). We were specifically 
concerned with potential collinearity issues because a major component of this study is focused 
on disambiguating the relationship of contempt, anger, disgust, sadness, and moral outrage with 
regards to norm violations and punishment decisions, and serial Likert scale ratings have a 
tendency to be correlated (Nabi, 2002; Gutierrez et al., 2012; Royzman et al., 2014). If the 
ratings provided for these emotions are highly collinear, regression analyses will not be suitable 
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and will result in both spurious and inconsistent results (Baayen, 2008). The collinearity analysis 
on the emotion and punishment ratings did reveal high collinearity (variance inflation factors for 
anger, disgust, and moral outrage all >8). Plots of the emotion and punishment scores by task 
condition from this pilot experiment are displayed in Figure 1).  
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Fig. 1: Mean Emotion and Punishment Ratings for The Pilot Study Wherein All Ratings 
Were Acquired Using Serial Likert Scales 
 
Note: Error bars show +/- 1 standard error of the mean.  
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Table 2: Principal Component Analysis of Factors When Using Multiple Likert Scales 
Factor Component 1 Component 2 
Anger 0.9 0.34 
Contempt 0.9 0.25 
Disgust 0.89 0.22 
Moral Outrage 0.93 0.28 
Sadness 0.29 0.96 
Punishment 0.86 0.32 
 
In order to better understand the nature of this collinearity and whether it could be 
avoided by means of data reduction, we performed a principal component analysis (PCA) with 
varimax rotation. A scree plot analysis on the results supported the conclusion that two latent 
variables underlie the data: First, a component consisting of anger, contempt, disgust, moral 
outrage, and the punishment decision; and a second component consisting of sadness. The first 
component included nearly identical and high loading values from each of the emotions and the 
punishment ratings (Table 2). Consequently, the pilot study indicated that collecting emotion 
responses in this fashion would result in data that could not be used to disambiguate the emotions 
of anger, contempt, disgust, and moral outrage as they relate to human punishment behavior. 
In order to overcome the limitations illustrated by the results of our pilot study, we 
implemented a new method to assess emotional responses (Rozin et al., 1999). Rather than rating 
each emotion, subjects were instructed to select a primary emotion (either anger, disgust, 
contempt, moral outrage, or sadness) that best identified their emotional state. Again, this 
occurred after phases 2 and 3 of scenario presentation. The different emotion response options 
were presented as a list, though the order of this list was randomized across trials. Subjects were 
instructed to click on one of the emotions to select it. After selecting a primary emotional 
response, subjects were asked to rate how strongly they experienced that emotion on a 10-point 
Likert scale with “0” as “Not at all” and “9” as “Extreme”. Participants then selected, on a 
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subsequent screen, the second strongest emotion they felt in response to the scenario, and 
subsequently rated this emotional experience on a Likert scale of the same format as the primary 
emotion. Thus each participant provided a primary and secondary emotional response after the 
second phase of the scenario (having seen only information about either harm or mental state), 
and again after complete presentation of the scenario (with information about both harm and 
mental state). Measurement of the punishment response was the same as in the pilot experiment 
(0 to 9 Likert scale). 
After completing the test scenario, participants were presented with an ‘attention check’ 
scenario. This scenario appeared identical to the test and anchoring scenarios in structure except 
that embedded in the scenario was a sentence with an instruction to provide a specific response 
to the emotion and punishment questions. This allowed us to screen out individuals who did not 
carefully read the scenarios. Following the attention check, basic demographic information was 
collected and individuals were debriefed and provided with instructions for compensation. 
Our statistical analyses focused on answering two primary questions: First, what are the 
emotional responses to varying levels of harm and mental state, both independently and when 
these factors are integrated? Second, can the experience of specific emotions be linked to 
punishment behavior? 
To address the first question, we relied on regression analyses to examine the 
relationships between the norm violation, emotion, and the punishment decision. For all 
regression analyses, predictors were standardized through z-transformation so as to enable 
meaningful comparison between the results of the regression. 
When analyzing emotion selected as the outcome variable and not as predictor (e.g. when 
examining the effect of the type of norm violation on the emotion the respondents selected) we 
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used linear probability models with each emotion expressed as a binary variable (selected or not) 
regressed, in independent analyses, on harm level, mental state level, and their interaction, with 
heteroskedastic robust standard errors to allow for non-normality of variances around the 
probability estimates (Aldrich and Nelson, 1984). Lines of best fit for the predicted probability of 
selecting each emotion as a function of harm and mental state were generated to further visualize 
these relationships.  
To address the second question, separate mediation analyses were run to test whether the 
expression of each emotion mediated the effect of harm, mental state, and the interaction of 
mental state and harm on subjects’ punishment ratings. Emotions were again treated as binary 
variables (selected or not). We used a counterfactually defined causal mediation method, as the 
product-of-coefficients approach to calculating indirect effects cannot be applied to binary 
mediators (Steen et al.; Imai et al., 2010; Pearl, 2012; Valeri and Vanderweele, 2013). We 
obtained estimates for the natural indirect effect for each emotion as a mediator of the effect of 
the harm, mental state, and their interaction on punishment using the R package Medflex (Steen 
et al., 1AD). Standard errors were calculated using the bootstrap method with 1000 draws 
(Preacher and Hayes, 2008). Additionally, 95% confidence intervals were generated for each 
indirect effect. 
 
RESULTS 
Punishment behavior was characterized by not only an effect of harm (b=0.38, se=0.04, 
p<.001, 95% CI [0.31, 0.45]) and mental state (b=0.60, se=0.04, p<.001, 95% CI [0.53, 0.67]) 
but also a superadditive interaction between the two (b=0.10, se=0.04, p=.01, 95% CI [0.03, 
0.17]) (Figure 2), consistent with prior findings (Ginther et al., 2016).  
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Fig. 2: Mean Punishment Ratings as a Function Of Mental State And Harm Level 
 
Note: Error bars display +/- 1 standard error of the mean. 
 
How do presentations of harm and mental state – independent of one another – affect the 
emotional response of the participants and, ultimately, their punishment decision? To assess the 
first part of this question, we examined subjects’ first emotion response, after they had only been 
presented with information as to the level of harm or mental state, but not both. Specifically, we 
tested for linear trends in subjects’ emotional responses as a function of level of mental state and 
level of harm, independently (path “A” in Figure 3).  
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Fig. 3: Graphical Depiction of Regression and Mediation Analyses Performed in the 
Present Study 
 
 
Note: Independent regression analyses were performed with level of mental state, harm, and the 
interaction as predictors. Linear regression was performed between 3 different paths: (1) path ‘A’ 
between the stimulus (either Mental State, Harm, or the interaction) and the emotion response, 
(2) path ‘B’ between the emotion response and the punishment amount, and (3) path ‘C’ between 
the stimulus and the punishment amount. Note that when examining the effect of Mental or 
Harm alone, the emotion selected following the presentation of that respective predictor (Mental 
State or Harm) was used. For the interaction we used the emotion selected after subjects 
evaluated the complete scenario. In a separate analysis, to determine the presence of a mediation 
effect, for each set of predictors (Mental State, Harm, and their interaction) we examined the size 
of the indirect effect (a*b1) in the presence of the direct effect (c).  
 
This revealed that expressions of sadness and moral outrage increased with increasing 
levels of harm severity while disgust and contempt decreased (note beta values in “Path A” 
column in Table 3 and see Figure 4 for a graphical depiction). For mental state, expressions of 
anger, disgust, and moral outrage increased as harm severity increased while sadness decreased 
(note beta values in “Path A” column in Table 4 and see Figure 5 for a graphical depiction).  
                                                
1 To be sure – as noted in the methods – we used a counterfactually defined causal mediation 
method in order to calculate the indirect effect due to concerns about the effect of a binary 
regressor (the emotion selection) on the product of coefficients approach (a*b). Nonetheless, the 
product of coefficients approach provides nearly identical results in this case and is helpful for 
conceptualizing the nature of the mediation effect.  
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Fig. 4: Predicted Probability Fits for Each Emotion for The First Emotion Rating When 
Harm Was Presented First 
 
Note: Shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals. 
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Fig. 5: Predicted Probability Fits for Each Emotion for the First Emotion Rating When 
Mental State was Presented First 
 
Note: Shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Using a mediation analysis, we assessed which of these emotional responses to harm or 
mental state might demonstrate an indirect effect on punishment decisions. The mediation 
analyses examine the size and directionality of the indirect effects (Path A and Path B in Figure 
3) in the presence of the direct effect (Path C in Figure 3). Moral outrage manifested an indirect 
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effect for both mental state and harm, while sadness manifested an indirect effect for harm alone. 
No other mediation effects were observed (see “Mediation Effect” columns in Tables 3 & 4).  
 
Table 3: Relationship Between Harm, Emotion, and Punishment 
 
Path A: Harm to Emotion Mediation Effect on Punishment 
Emotion b se p 95% CI b se p 95% CI 
Anger -0.02 0.02 0.485 [-0.06, 0.03] -0.004 0.01 0.525 [-0.02, 0.01] 
Disgust -0.07 0.02 <.001** [-0.10, -0.04] -0.01 0.01 0.466 [-0.03, 0.02] 
Contempt -0.03 0.02 0.035 [-0.07, -0.002] 0.01 0.01 0.389 [-0.01, 0.02] 
Sadness 0.06 0.03 <.001** [0.01, 0.11] -0.03 0.01 0.024* [-0.05, -0.004] 
Moral Outrage 0.06 0.02 0.001** [0.02, 0.09] 0.02 0.01 0.032* [0.003, 0.05] 
 
Note: “Path A: Harm to Emotion” column presents standardized regression coefficients of path 
A (see Figure 2) between the harm stimulus and the emotional response for each emotion at the 
first emotion rating (when only the harm had been presented). The “Mediation Effect on 
Punishment” column presents the magnitude and statistical significance of the mediation effect 
on the punishment decision.   
*p < .05. **p < .005.  
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Table 4: Relationship Between Mental State, Emotion, and Punishment 
 
Path A: Mental State to Emotion Mediation Effect on Punishment 
Emotion b se p 95% CI b se p 95% CI 
Anger 0.05 0.02 0.034* [0.004, 0.09] 0.01 0.01 0.259 [-0.01, 0.02] 
Disgust 0.05 0.02 0.006* [0.01, 0.08] -0.01 0.01 0.126 [-0.03, 0.004] 
Contempt -0.01 0.02 0.579 [-0.04, 0.02] 0 0 0.633 [-0.01, 0.01] 
Sadness -0.13 0.02 <.001** [-0.18, -0.08] 0 0.01 0.745 [-0.02, 0.02] 
Moral Outrage 0.04 0.02 0.014* [0.01, 0.08] 0.02 0.01 0.037* [0.001, 0.04] 
 
Note: “Path A: Mental State to Emotion” column presents standardized regression coefficients of 
path A (see Figure 3) between the mental state stimulus and the emotional response for each 
emotion at the first emotion rating (when only the mental state had been presented). The 
“Mediation Effect on Punishment” column presents the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the mediation effect on the punishment decision.   
*p < .05. **p < .005.  
 
Thus, while various emotions tracked increasing levels of either mental state or harm, 
only moral outrage increased commensurately with both increasing levels of harm and mental 
state. Further, only moral outrage and sadness displayed a mediating effect between the 
triggering factors (harm, mental state) and the punishment response.   
In addition to examining the characteristics of mental state and harm independently, we 
examined the integration of mental state and harm and the commensurate effect on punishment 
by repeating the above analyses on the second emotional response (i.e., the response provided 
after the evaluation of both mental state and harm). While before we tested for linear trends as a 
function of mental state and harm independently, here we examine a linear trend with the 
interaction of mental state and harm.  
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Fig. 6: Lines of Best Fit for The Predicted Probability of Selecting Each Emotion in the 
Second Emotion Rating as a Function of Harm and Mental State 
 
Note: Shaded areas depict 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Moral outrage, contempt, and sadness all demonstrated an interaction between the mental 
state and harm factors (see “Path A” column in Table 5 and Figure 6 for a graphical depiction). 
Importantly, we only observed a superadditive interaction–paralleling the punishment behavior–
in the case of moral outrage: there was no effect on anger and disgust, and the interaction of 
harm and mental state negatively predicted contempt and sadness. Specifically, subjects 
experienced sadness primarily in response to unintentional harms, and the likelihood of 
experiencing sadness scaled with the severity of the harm (Figure 6 and Figure 7). The 
interaction of harm and mental state also negatively predicted contempt, with the interaction 
effect driven by a large proportion of subjects experiencing contempt for negligent accidents that 
resulted in low severity harms (Figure 6).  
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Fig. 7: Emotion Response Proportions for The Second Emotion Rating as a Function of 
Different Interactions of Mental State and Harm 
 
Note: High MS refers to Purposeful and Reckless; Low MS refers to Blameless and Negligent. 
High Harm refers to life altering and death; Low Harm refers to negligible and substantial.  
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Table 5: Relationship Between the Interaction Of Mental State And Harm, Emotion, And 
Punishment 
 
Path A: Interaction to Emotion Mediation Effect on Punishment 
Emotion b se p 95% CI b se p 95% CI 
Anger -0.002 0.02 0.943 [-0.05, 0.05] 0 0 0.945 [-0.01, 0.01] 
Disgust -0.01 0.02 0.385 [-0.05, 0.02] -0.003 0.01 0.526 [-0.02, 0.01] 
Contempt -0.05 0.01 0.001** [-0.07, -0.02] -0.004 0.01 0.529 [-0.02, 0.01] 
Sadness -0.09 0.02 <.001** [-0.14, -0.05] 0.07 0.02 <.001** [0.03, 0.11] 
Moral Outrage 0.16 0.02 <.001** [0.11, 0.20] 0.06 0.01 <.001** [0.03, 0.08] 
 
Note: “Path A: Interaction to Emotion” column presents standardized regression coefficients of 
path A (see Figure 2) between the interaction term and the emotional response for each emotion 
at the second emotion rating (when both mental state and harm had been presented). The 
“Mediation Effect on Punishment” column presents the magnitude and statistical significance of 
the mediation effect on the punishment decision.   
*p < .05. **p < .005.  
 
The above analyses indicate that moral outrage was the only emotion sensitive to 
increasing harms and culpable intent, and that moral outrage displayed a superadditive 
interaction effect in relation to mental state and harm that mirrors the superadditive effect present 
in subjects’ punishment decisions (as in Figure 2). To determine whether the expression of moral 
outrage in response to the interaction of harm and mental state might drive the superadditive 
punishment behavior, we assessed whether that emotion – or any other – mediated the effect of 
the interaction of harm and mental state on subjects’ punishment decisions. Mediation effects 
were present only for sadness and moral outrage, though they mediated the opposite effects on 
punishment (see “Mediation Effect” column Table 5).  Specifically, subjects were more likely to 
experience moral outrage when there were high levels of harm and culpable mental states, but 
less likely to experience sadness. Furthermore, expression of moral outrage was associated with 
greater punishment while the expression of sadness was associated with lesser punishment. We 
compared the strength of this mediation effect with the strength of the mediation effect that 
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moral outrage displayed for harm and mental state independently. The mediation effect for the 
interaction is substantially greater than for either harm or mental state (Z = 2.86, p = 0.0043) 
(Paternoster et al., 1998).  
 
DISCUSSION 
Our results indicate that the expression of moral outrage is uniquely critical to third-party 
punishment (TPP) behavior in humans in two ways. First, we demonstrate that while most of the 
emotions tested respond to increases in harm or increases in mental state, moral outrage is 
selectively expressed by the interaction of culpable intent and harmful outcomes. Second, we 
observe that the expression of moral outrage selectively mediates the effects of both harm and 
mental state on punishment decisions. We discuss these two links between moral outrage and 
punishment below.  
As noted in the introduction, recent findings have observed that punishment behavior is 
characterized by a superadditive effect of culpable intent and harmful outcome (Ginther et al., 
2016; Treadway et al., 2014). A primary goal of the present study was to determine what 
emotion(s) may be associated with the interaction of these two components. While a number of 
studies have investigated the relationship between emotion and punishment decisions (Fehr and 
Gachter, 2002a; Kogut, 2011; Salerno and Peter-Hagene, 2013; Laurent et al., 2014), few have 
empirically investigated the types of norm violations that induce the expression of specific 
emotions (Rozin et al., 1999; Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; Russell and Piazza, 2013). Moreover, 
to our knowledge, none have examined the emotional response specific to the interaction of a 
culpable mental state and severe harms, the lynchpin of punishable behavior. Our observation 
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that the expression of moral outrage is selective to, and predominates at, the intersection of 
culpable intent and harmful outcomes is consistent with Carlsmith (2002) who put this emotion 
at the junction of serious offenses and the absence of mitigating circumstances.  However, 
Carlsmith (2002) did not demonstrate that moral outrage – as compared to contempt, anger, or 
disgust – uniquely reflected the intersection of these twin components that define human 
punishment behavior. By revealing that subjects overwhelmingly expressed moral outrage at this 
junction, our results indicate that moral outrage is uniquely reflective of the human emotional 
response to severe harms that are the result of culpable conduct. 
This aspect of our results does conflict, in part, with a recent study by Landmann and 
Hess (2016) that found that anger ratings were predicted by moral violation regardless of the 
outcome caused. They concluded that this anger at the intent to commit a violation independent 
of the harm can be defined as moral outrage. While our findings do support the notion that anger 
is the predominant response in the case of culpable intent without a harmful outcome (see Figure 
S4), our results are inconsistent with their conclusion that moral outrage is selective to intent. 
This discrepancy in findings is likely due to the fact that Landmann and Hess did not explicitly 
gauge subjects’ moral outrage but instead relied on inference to reinterpret expressed anger as 
moral outrage.  
The second major finding of the present study, derived from the mediation analysis, is 
that expression of moral outrage is selectively linked to augmented punishment decisions in the 
case of severe intentional harms. Insofar as moral outrage appears to be associated with 
punishment decisions, this result is consistent with two prior studies (Carlsmith, 2002; Salerno & 
Peter-Hagene, 2013). However, in contrast to these two prior studies, we demonstrate that 
expression of moral outrage is, in this way, unique among emotions. That we did not observe an 
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indirect effect of contempt, anger or disgust on punishment decisions is evidence that these 
emotional states are not, even when experienced by subjects, influencing the punishment 
outcome in the same manner as moral outrage. Thus, it would appear that moral outrage may be 
a unique emotional motivator linking severe culpable norm violations and punishment of third-
parties.  
Studies of punishment decision-making often speak only of the emotional drivers of 
punishment, not of emotions that may act to suppress action (Carlsmith et al., 2002a; Salerno and 
Peter-Hagene, 2013). Two of our results support a conclusion that sadness may operate in such a 
fashion. First, we observed that sadness is the predominant response, at an eight-to-one ratio, 
when a severe harm is unintentionally caused, or put another way, when an accident occurs. 
Second, and critically, expression of sadness induced the opposite effect to moral outrage of the 
norm violation on punishment; that is, sadness mediated reduced punishment ratings. Previous 
studies have found evidence that sadness can blunt subsequent anger and reduce the influence of 
anger on cognitive judgments (Winterich et al., 2010), perhaps as a result of empathy towards the 
offender (Skorinko et al., 2014), thus reducing punishment. While further research is necessary 
to establish a causal link between expression of sadness and punishment suppression, this 
observation can potentially have substantial real-world application in both judicial and policy 
domains.   
Together, our results present further support that moral outrage may be an emotional 
experience distinct from the experience of anger, contempt, and disgust, which have all been 
studied much more extensively in the literature, especially in the realm of punishment decision-
making (Gutierrez et al., 2012; Russell and Piazza, 2013). Whether or not moral outrage is a 
specific emotion or instead a combination of distinct cognitive, affective, and behavioral states is 
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debatable and perhaps, ultimately, an issue of semantics (Haidt, 2001; Batson et al., 2007; 
Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; Cameron et al., 2015; Landmann and Hess, 2016). What is clear, 
however, is that when subjects are asked to identify their emotions after evaluating a severe 
culpable harm they select moral outrage over anger at a two-to-one ratio and disgust at a three-
to-one ratio. Combined with the results from the regression and mediation analyses, the evidence 
indicates that moral outrage – more so than contempt, anger, or disgust – reflects the emotional 
backbone of human TPP behavior. 
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4. DISTINCT EMOTIONAL PROFILES FOR SECOND- AND THIRD-PARTY NORM 
VIOLATIONS 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In chapter three we reveal the central role of moral outrage in third-party punishment 
(3PP) behavior. This result raises the question of whether moral outrage similarly drives 
punishment by second-parties (2PP), or if it is unique to third-party norm violations.  
Prior research has failed to provide any evidence of 3PP outside of the human species 
(Riedl et al., 2012). Furthermore, studies have demonstrated that 3PP has a distinct 
developmental timecourse from 2PP (McAuliffe et al., 2015). And thus, while 2PP and 3PP are–
in many ways–similar, they may be fundamentally distinct in how they evolved and, 
commensurately, in the cognitive mechanisms that support them. One way of exploring this 
possibility is by contrasting the cognitive and affective states that arise in response to the 
conditions that induce each behavior (i.e., second-party (2P) and third-party (3P) norm 
violations).    
As detailed in chapter three, a number of studies have done this by exploring the 
emotional response to norm violations and accompanying punishment decisions. Unfortunately, 
few have focused on 2PP and rarely have studies compared 2PP and 3PP specifically. Early work 
exploring the emotional correlates of 3P norm violations proposed the ‘CAD’ (contempt, anger, 
disgust) triad hypothesis as a means of connecting emotional responses to norm violations 
(Rozin et al., 1999; Shweder et al., 2013). This hypothesis associates contempt with violations of 
community/hierarchy, anger with violations of autonomy/individual rights, and disgust with 
violations of divinity/purity. Although, as noted in chapter three, these proposed associations 
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have been found to be relatively inconsistent, researchers have nonetheless built on the ‘CAD’ 
triad hypothesis to inform our understanding of 3PP (Hutcherson and Gross, 2011; Russell and 
Piazza, 2013).  
In regards to 2P norm violations, few studies have examined the corresponding emotional 
response. Those that have, have identified anger as the primary motivating emotion (Small and 
Loewenstein, 2005). Anger is typically evoked in response to unequal treatment or the violation 
of a social norm and has been associated with increased 2PP (Pillutla and Murnighan, 1996). 
Directly comparing 2P and 3P is challenging because it is difficult to create a task that 
can provide for a 2P and 3P violation that controls for other variables while also being believable 
to subjects. There have been some attempts, however. Batson et al. (2007) had participants rate 
their anger experiencing an unfair allocation or, alternatively, witnessing a third-party receive an 
unfair allocation. They found that individuals expressed greater anger in response to a personal 
harm (second-party) than for third-party violations (Batson et al., 2007). In contrast, Hardecker 
et al., 2016 found no difference in anger expression in response to norm violations between 2PP 
and 3PP conditions for children aged 2-3 years.  
While contempt, anger and disgust have received the lion’s share of the research, recent 
work has called attention to the role of moral outrage in 3PP (Carlsmith et al., 2002; Salerno and 
Peter-Hagene, 2013). The authors have identified that moral outrage is particularly evoked by 3P 
norm violations, and it–unlike anger, contempt, and disgust–mediates the relationship between 
the norm violation and the punishment decision (see chapter three). Left unanswered from the 
latter study is whether moral outrage plays a similar role in responding to 2P norm violations or 
if it is specific to 3PP. A few scholars have hypothesized that moral outrage is 3P specific 
(Batson et al., 2007; Landmann and Hess, 2016), though this has not been empirically tested. The 
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present experiment seeks to answer this very question by comparing the emotional profiles of 
those who experience both second and third-party norm violations under similar conditions. We 
hypothesize that moral outrage may be expressed specifically to 3P norm violations, lending 
support to the possibility that humans’ unique proclivity towards 3PP may be rooted in the 
neurocognitive experience of moral outrage.  
 
METHODS 
We recruited 360 subjects to play one round of a widely used economic game (the 
“Investment Game”) where individuals participated as either second or third parties to a norm 
violation and also made punishment decisions.  
In the Investment Game a player, labeled the Investor, is bestowed points. Investors have 
the option of investing none, some, or all of these points with a Trustee. Invested points are 
multiplied threefold. The rub of the game, however, is that the Trustee can keep as much of the 
investment, and the returns on the investment, without any obligation, beyond social norms, to 
return some of the investment to the Investor (Berg et al., 1995).  
We modified the game slightly by adding two features, both of which have been 
successfully applied in previous studies. First, we provided Investors with the ability to spend 
some of their money on punishing (or rewarding) the Trustee at the end of the game (Pedersen et 
al., 2013) by paying to adjust their ultimate payout. The punishment was costly to the Investor 
(4:1 ratio of punishment:cost). Second, we added the role of an Observer on one half of trials 
(Charness et al., 2008). The Observer witnessed, without the knowledge of the Investor or the 
Trustee, the behavior of both and could punish (or reward) the Trustee at the end of the game just 
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as the Investor could. As a result we could evaluate both 2PP (via Investors) and 3PP (via 
Observers) in the same general task. 
Participants were recruited to participate in this online game through Amazon 
Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT has become a widely used and accepted means of recruiting 
participants for social science and psychology research (Paolacci et al., 2010; Sprouse, 2010; 
Mason and Suri, 2011; Crump et al., 2013). In addition to convenience and cost, AMT provides a 
population sample far more representative than samples of convenience used in most 
psychological studies (Buhrmester et al., 2011). The Vanderbilt University Institutional Review 
Board approved the experimental protocol and all participants provided their informed consent. 
In order to increase the likelihood that subjects believed they were actually interacting 
with other people, the study consisted of three separate stages. Subjects were told that the three 
stages allowed us to collect the responses of the people they were participating with before 
proceeding. We took this approach based on pilot data indicating that when the entire study took 
place in one sitting many subjects did not believe they were actually participating with other 
individuals.  
The first stage contained the instructions for the investment game and a test for 
comprehension of the instructions. The test was comprised of three questions and was used to 
ensure careful reading of the instructions. The instructions stated that there was only one round 
to the game and that subjects would be randomly assigned to either the role of the Investor or the 
Trustee (in reality, subjects were never assigned the role of the Trustee but were, as described 
below, assigned the role of the Observer in one half of trials). After reading the instructions and 
correctly answering the comprehension questions, subjects were asked to provide their first name 
and provide a few sentences on why, if they were selected as the Trustee (again, this was never 
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the case) the Investor should trust them. They were then told they would be contacted once 
matched with other participants.  
Approximately 5-10 minutes after completing the first stage, subjects received an email 
to continue the study. Upon clicking the link, they were presented with a page that told them that 
they had either been assigned as the Investor or the Observer. 
If selected as the Investor (2PP), subjects were provided the name of the person selected 
as the Trustee as well as their short statement, which indicated a willingness to cooperate. The 
name and short statement were drawn from one of two individuals’ information provided during 
piloting of the study and were counterbalanced across subjects. Subjects assigned to be Investors 
were then provided with a prompt asking how much they wanted to invest from a sum of 20 
“points” they were provided. Subjects were told that these points would be converted into a “not 
insubstantial?” bonus payment at the end of the study and that this bonus was in addition to the 
payment (approximately $6/hr) for their participation.  
If selected as the Observer (3PP), the role was briefly explained and subjects were told 
that they were not previously informed of this position out of concern that knowledge of its 
existence would affect how Investors and Trustees acted in the 2PP condition (e.g., if subjects in 
the 2PP condition were aware of the Observer they may be less likely to punish the Trustee). 
Observers were also told that they would see the actions of the other players as they occurred. 
Finally, Observers were presented with the names and statements provided by the “subjects” 
selected as both the Investor and the Trustee. The names and statements were the same as those 
used in the 2PP condition, again counterbalanced across subjects. In the 3PP condition, as in the 
2PP condition, it was made clear that only one round would be played. 
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After another 5-10 minute break, subjects received one last email that directed them to 
the third and final stage of the study. 
 Here, Investors were told what percentage of the points they invested (and that were 
tripled) were returned to them by the Trustee. The amount was set to be a random value between 
10 and 30% of the point total held by the Trustee. Subjects were also told the monetary value of 
their final point total. The monetary value was fixed at $0.40, regardless of how many points 
they ended up with. The dollar amount that the trustee finished with was proportionally scaled to 
the amount of points the Trustee ended with compared to the Investor. For example, if the 
Trustee ended with 40 points and the Investor with 10, then the Trustee would end with $1.60 
compared to the Investor’s $0.40.  
Observers were similarly informed of the number of points returned to the Investor by the 
Trustee. Again, the amount was fixed to between 10 and 30% of the total. The Observer was also 
provided the monetary equivalent of the ending point total, which was calculated in the same 
way, with the Investor’s total fixed at $0.40. 
Alongside this information, Investors and Observers were asked to provide their 
emotional state in relation to the Trustee’s decision (“Which of the following emotions best 
describes how you feel in response to the Trustee’s decision?”). Subjects could choose between 
Anger, Disgust, Sadness, Contempt, and Moral Outrage. These emotions were selected on the 
basis of chapter 3. Accompanying this question, subjects were asked to provide a rating of the 
strength of the selected emotion on a six-point scale from “Not at all” to “Extreme”. 
On the next screen, both Investors and Observers were informed that the Trustee had not 
yet been informed of the monetary equivalent of his bonus and that they could adjust the 
monetary payout of the Trustee at the 4:1 cost. In the case of the Investor, the cost of adjusting 
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the score was paid out of their $0.40 bonus. In the case of the observer, they were instructed that 
they received a cash bonus of $0.40 for their participation and that any amount used to adjust the 
bonus of the trustee would come from that total. Subjects were told they could increase or 
decrease the bonus. To avoid possible demand effects, the word punish was never used.  
After completing the study, participants filled out a funnel questionnaire to determine 
whether the participants were aware of the possibility that they were not actually interacting with 
other participants(Pedersen et al., 2013). Subjects that demonstrated suspicion on the basis of the 
questionnaire as determined by a blind researcher were excluded from the analysis. After the 
questionnaire, subjects were debriefed, paid, and awarded their bonuses.  
 
RESULTS 
Both second and third parties punished Trustees who acted unfairly (Figure 1). Overall, 
57% of second parties punished unfair Trustees while 69% of third parties punished unfair 
Trustees. Average punishment amounts in the 2PP and 3PP condition were significantly greater 
than zero for both (one sample Wilcoxon signed rank test (2P: z = -8.17, p < 0.001 n = 167; 3P: z 
= -8.00, p < 0.001, n = 169)). For those participants that punished, we did not observe a 
difference in the amount they punished Trustees (z = 1.80, p = 0.181). Thus, it appears from the 
results of the behavior that 2PP and 3PP are quite similar. 
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Fig. 1: Dual Histograms Displaying Amount That Subjects Changed the Trustee’s Bonus In 
Both the 2PP and 3PP Versions of the Game 
 
Note: The bonus adjustment cost subjects 25% of the amount of the adjustment.  
 
Contrasting the emotion selected in response to the norm violation, we observed no 
difference in the frequency in which subjects selected contempt, sadness, or disgust for second-
party violations as compared to third-party violations (p’s > 0.3) (Figure 2). However, moral 
outrage was significantly more highly represented for third-party violations (χ(1) = 3.89, p = 
0.048) and anger was significantly more highly represented for second-party violations (χ(1) = 
6.00, p = 0.014).  
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Fig. 2: Number of Subjects Selecting Each of The Emotions as Their Primary Emotional 
Response to The Second- Or Third-Party Norm Violation 
 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
Both 2P and 3P norm violations spur punishment behavior in most individuals. As an 
initial matter, the parity between the frequency of 2PP and 3PP indicates that subjects found a 
norm violation to have occurred in both conditions. However, the parity also stands in contrast to 
a number of studies that have indicated that 3PP is less robust when compared to 2PP and even 
that 3PP is, perhaps, illusory, a product of methodological limitations in the laboratory studies 
that produce the behavior (Pedersen et al., 2013). Since the present study accounts for the 
methodological issues raised in Pedersen et al. (demand effects, audience effects, inadvertent 
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consequences of using the strategy method and affective forecasting), our results support the 
conclusion 3PP behavior is reliably expressed in humans. We believe our finding that 3PP is 
expressed at similar levels as 2PP can be attributed to the efforts made in the study design to 
create a specific norm (the promise to cooperate), which was expressly violated. To our 
knowledge most studies rely on the expectation that the other will cooperate, which may or may 
not be a reasonable expectation in a staged interaction. Additionally, our efforts to make subjects 
believe that they were actually interacting with other participants should also contribute to the 
validity of our construct.  
Though 2P and 3P norm violations appear to be associated with a similar frequency and 
amount of punishment, our results indicate that they are not associated with a similar emotional 
response. Specifically, the data indicate that expression of anger is largely limited to 2P 
violations while expression of moral outrage is similarly limited to 3P violations. Responses of 
contempt, disgust, and sadness, however, appear to be non-distinct between 2P and 3P violations.  
The contrast in the expression of anger and moral outrage for 2P and 3P norm violations 
has two likely explanations. First, moral outrage may simply be a synonym for anger in a third-
party context(Batson et al., 2007). That is, the cognitive, affective, and behavioral properties of 
moral outrage may be identical to that of anger but subjects in a 3P context label the anger as 
being moral outrage. Alternatively, moral outrage may be a distinct emotional experience from 
anger. Our study is limited in its ability to distinguish between the two interpretations.   
Nonetheless, we believe the evidence favors the interpretation that moral outrage reflects 
a distinct neurocognitive state. Three observations are particularly compelling. First, studies in 
young children reveal that the onset of 3PP lags in relation to 2PP (McAuliffe et al., 2015). If 
moral outrage were simply anger by another name, it would be more likely that 3PP would have 
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a similar developmental timecourse. Second, that researchers have been unable to observe 3PP in 
other species indicates that 3PP is supported by distinct neurocognitive mechanisms (Riedl et al., 
2012). Of course, there are other explanations for both of these observations beyond the 
possibility that moral outrage and anger are distinct. For instance, the lack of 3PP in young 
children and non-human primates may be due to the failure of both to detect 3P violations and 
not the fact that 3PP is motivated by a distinct emotional experience. Our third observation–that 
expressed moral outrage, but not anger, mediates the relationship between norm violations and 
punishment decisions (see chapter 3)– does indicate that anger and moral outrage do play distinct 
roles in motivating 3PP.  
Distinguishing whether or not moral outrage and anger are the same neurocognitive state 
may ultimately be difficult to determine solely on the basis of behavioral observations. 
Neuroimaging may thus prove helpful. One study has indicated distinguishable brain activity in a 
2PP and 3PP task (Corradi-Dell'Acqua et al., 2013), though the design did not allow for 
attributing this distinction with the subject’s emotional experience. Some studies have purported 
to be able to distinguish emotional state using multivariate analyses (Saarimäki et al., 2016), 
though the validity of these conclusions has proven a matter of debate (Clark-Polner et al., 2016).  
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CONCLUSION 
Across four separate studies we examined the properties of human punishment decision-
making. Specifically, we sought to explore not only the brain systems that support punishment 
decisions, but the conditions that motivate punishment more generally.  
In the behavioral component of chapter one we revealed how punishment appears to be 
driven by the superadditive interaction of a culpable mental state and a harm. Using fMRI, we 
built upon this behavioral foundation to identify neural systems that supported the evaluation of 
the separate components of mental state and harm and their integration. Our findings further 
suggest that the amygdala plays a crucial role in mediating the interaction of mental state and 
harm information, whereas the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex plays a crucial, final-stage role, 
both in integrating mental state and harm information and in selecting a suitable punishment 
amount.  
While chapter one indicated a key relationship between the profile of amygdala activation 
and subjects’ punishment decisions, the data were unable to indicate whether or not a causal 
relationship existed. Chapter two attempted to provide evidence of a causal relationship by 
inducing targeted activation in the amygdala during a punishment decision-making task. In other 
words, chapter two assessed whether targeted activation of the amygdala could shift punishment 
decisions, and if so, how? The null results, however, left open many possible interpretations and 
thus proved largely uninformative.  
While the first two chapters focused on the brain mechanisms that support punishment 
decision-making, chapters three and four examine what motivates people to punish, with a 
specific attention to the role of emotion.  
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Chapter three focused on identifying the emotional correlates of the superadditive 
interaction of mental state and harm identified in the examination of third-party punishment in 
chapter one. We found that–unlike anger, contempt, and disgust–moral outrage is evoked by the 
interaction of culpable mental state and severe harms, and it alone mediates the relationship 
between this interaction and punishment decisions. We observed that sadness has the opposite 
effect of mediating a dampening of punishment in response to accidental harms.   
The results from chapter three raised the question of whether the privileged role of moral 
outrage in punishment decision-making is specific to third-party punishment. Given the 
similarities between second- and third-party punishment, it is reasonable that they may draw 
from similar cognitive and affective states. On the other hand, a number of observations hint at 
the possibility that third-party punishment has a unique neurocognitive framework. By exposing 
participants to second- and third-party norm violations, while controlling for other factors, we 
identified that moral outrage does appear to be unique to third-party violations. Anger, on the 
other hand, appears unique to second-party violations.  
Together, the results map out both the network of brain regions that support punishment 
decision-making, as well as the neurocognitive states that motivate the behavior. A ripe avenue 
for future research is an attempt to link the two. In other words, beyond the regions that support 
punishment decision-making, can we identify the mechanisms that drive punishment decision-
making. The activation profile of the amygdala is tantalizing evidence of a possible connection, 
but chapter two was unable to provide further evidence of a connection between the two. The 
difficulty of linking cognitive and affective states with brain systems extends beyond this very 
research and is an area of active study, and debate, in the neurocognitive sciences more 
generally.  
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Beyond the results themselves, these studies hopefully provide a framework for future 
research at this exciting junction between neuroscience, psychology, and law. As just one 
example, the results from Chapter one provide a detailed examination, through behavioral 
modelling and neuroimaging analyses, of how punishment decisions are made under ideal 
conditions. As noted in the introduction, punishment decision-making is often subject to any 
number of biases. By starting with an existing framework we can better understand, for instance, 
how punishment decisions might go wrong. One intriguing example of how this work can be so 
leveraged is examining the effect of character information on punishment decision-making.  
Every jurisdiction in the United States has adopted some version of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 404. This rule provides that evidence of a person’s character or trait may not be 
admitted to prove behavior in accordance with the character or trait. Rule 404 is based on the 
presumption that character evidence is of little probative value while also being highly 
prejudicial. The rules committee that wrote rule 404 was concerned that such evidence “subtly 
permits the trier of fact to reward the good man or to punish the bad man because of their 
respective characters despite what the evidence in the case shows actually happened.” However, 
while the rationale for rule 404 extends beyond the bounds of a trial, its protections do not. Every 
day, police officers, district attorneys, and even the public make decisions and intuitions 
regarding guilt and punishment. These decisions are made without any of the protections 
afforded by Rule 404. Three fascinating questions present themselves. First, 
does character evidence actually influence third party punishment decisions? Second, to what 
extent can individuals restrain these influences upon instruction to do so? Third, what are the 
neural mechanisms that mediate the influence of such character evidence, as well as the 
mechanisms that support the potential disruption of this influence? By using the results from 
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these studies as a starting point, answering these questions becomes a much simpler proposition 
and one our lab has already started pursuing.   
The most salient conclusion from the research presented above may be that neuroscience 
and psychology provide a rich toolbox to examine longstanding legal phenomena and 
assumptions. From the psychophysics of conscious perception, to massive online studies 
recruiting thousands of participants, and to machine learning on multivariate data acquired using 
fMRI, the tools used here are a demonstration of what’s possible when leveraging established 
knowledge and techniques from multiple fields. I hope it provides a useful foundation for what’s 
to come.  
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